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Abstract
Policymakers and scholars – both lawyers and economists – have long been
pondering the optimal design of default rules. From the classic works on
“mimicking” defaults for contracts and corporations to the modern rush to
set “sticky” default rules to promote policies as diverse as organ donations,
retirement savings, consumer protection, and data privacy, the optimal
design of default rules has featured as a central regulatory challenge. The
key element driving the design is opt-out costs—how to minimize them, or
alternatively how to raise them to make the default sticky. Much of the
literature has focused on “mechanical” opt-out costs—the effort people
incur to select a non-default alternative. This focus is too narrow. A more
important factor affecting opt-out is information—the knowledge people
must acquire to make informed opt-out decisions. But, unlike high
mechanical costs, high information costs need not make defaults stickier;
they may instead make the defaults “slippery.” This counterintuitive claim
is due to the phenomenon of uninformed opt-out, which we identify and
characterize. Indeed, the importance of uninformed opt-out requires a
reassessment of the conventional wisdom about Nudge and asymmetric or
libertarian paternalism. We also show that different defaults provide
different incentives to acquire the information necessary for informed optout. With the ballooning use of default rules as a policy tool, our
information-costs theory provides valuable guidance to policymakers.
Keywords: Default Rules, Behavioral Economics, Nudge, Transaction Costs,
Information Costs.
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I. Introduction
The design of default rules—provisions that govern unless actively negated—is one of the
central techniques of lawmaking. Because of its centrality, the question of how to design
optimal default rules has been the subject of enormous commentary. Traditional law and
economics scholarship argued that default rules should mimic the will of the parties,
because otherwise they would force people to waste transactions costs in disclaiming the
defaults. If the population governed by a default rule is heterogeneous, continues this
transaction-costs argument, better enact a “majoritarian” default so as to reduce the
aggregate cost of opt-out. 1
More recently, the behavioral economics literature has adopted a markedly different
approach, asking not how to reduce opt-out costs but instead how to optimally exploit their
presence. This Nudge-inspired literature suggests that the “stickiness” of default rules—
the tendency of people not to override defaults because of high opt-out costs—is a blessed
feature that could improve social welfare. Sticky default rules have been hailed as a major
policy tool—an effective behaviorally-informed solution to the challenge of helping people
secure superior outcomes. 2 It is difficult to exaggerate the hopes that have been hung on
sticky default rules. Devoted advocates view sticky defaults as a “one-size-fits-all” solution
to many contracting failures and other social problems. 3 From mortgage products 4 to

See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER AND THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (6th ed., 2011); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed., 2007); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATION OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW (2004); Lucian A. Bebchuk and Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of
Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991); Charles Goetz and Robert
Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward A General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967
(1983); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.
J. 389 (1993).
2
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH,
AND HAPPINESS (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5, 9 (2013) (“[D]efault
rule . . . count as prime “nudges,” understood as interventions that maintain freedom of choice, that do not
impose mandates or bans, but that nonetheless incline people’s choices in a particular direction . . . . Default
rules may produce significantly better outcomes.”).
3
See Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir, A One-Size-Fits-All Solution, N.Y. TIMES
(December 26, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/26/opinion/26barr.html. But see Jon M.
Jachimowicz et al., When and Why Defaults Influence Decisions: A Meta-Analysis of Default Effects, 3
BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y 159 (2019) (adopting a more nuanced approach and explaining why some defaults are
more effective, i.e., stickier, than others).
4
See Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir, An Opt-Out Home Mortgage System (The
Hamilton Project, Brookings, Discussion Paper No. 2008-14, 2008).
1
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student loans, 5 from privacy protections 6 to retirement savings 7 and organ donations, 8
proposals to produce better outcomes via sticky defaults abound.
Because the presence of opt-out costs is so profoundly critical for the design of default
rules, you would think that a rich account has been developed to explain what exactly are
these opt-out costs that the earlier tradition wants to minimize and the more recent approach
wants to exploit. It hasn’t. The typical view focuses on what we call “mechanical costs”:
the process of developing and drafting a tailored alternative to the default. In negotiated
contracts, this process may be time consuming, and thus mechanical costs can be large. 9 In
mass contracts, opt-outs are usually cheap—pre-drafted by the business (e.g., disclaiming
a default warranty) and readily assented-to by the consumer (e.g., by clicking “I Agree”).
Even so, when summed over a vast number of transactions they add up to a non-trivial
social cost. 10 Similarly, in non-contractual settings—think organ donations—the perperson mechanical costs are not large, but they add-up quickly when millions of people
opt-out. To make defaults stickier, lawmakers or businesses may try to increase the
mechanical costs. 11 Lawmakers may require more disclosures, segregated signatures, and
See James C. Cox et al., Designed to Fail: Effects of the Default Option and Information Complexity on
Student Loan Payment (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25258, 2018).
6
Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of
Natural Persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, ch. II, art. 7, § 2
(“...the request for consent shall be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other
matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language.”) [hereinafter GDPR].
7
See James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian & Andrew Metrick, For Better or for Worse: Default
Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 81, 83 (David A. Wise
ed., 2004) (“[A]utomatic enrollment has a large impact on contribution rates . . . 65–87 percent of new plan
participants save at the default contribution rate.”); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of
Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1149, 1150 (2001) (“[T]he
default contribution rate and default investment allocation chosen by the company for automatic enrollment
has a strong influence on the savings behavior.”). For a critique, see Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How
Behavioral Economics Trims its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1598–99 (2014).
8
See Eric J. Johnson and Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives? 302 SCIENCE 1338 (2003).
9
See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1982) (“The obstacles to cooperation are
portrayed as the cost of communicating, the time spent negotiating, the cost of enforcing agreements, etc.
These obstacles can all be described as transaction costs of bargaining.”). A different type of opt-out cost in
arms-length contracts are “strategic costs”—the delay or failure to reach agreement in the presence of
strategic bargaining behavior. See, e.g., Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game
Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV 215, 226 (“Strategic behavior costs, in contrast,
are the losses suffered because bargainers have the incentive to maximize their individual gains rather than
the total surplus from exchange. . . . Such actions may include selling or buying a lesser quantity . . . or
extended haggling, which both takes up valuable time and delays enjoyment of the bargain.”).
10
At the individual level (namely, without aggregating across many individuals), time-inconsistent
preferences can amplify the effects of small opt-out costs. See John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson,
and Brigitte C. Madrian, Behavioral Household Finance, in 1 HANDBOOK OF BEHAV. ECON., Vol. 1, Ch. 3,
Sec. X (Douglas Bernheim, Stefano DellaVigna, and David Laibson, eds., 2018).
11
See, e.g., Loi 2016-41 du 26 janvier 2016 de modernization de notre système de santé [Law 2016-41 of
January 26, 2016 on the modernization of our healthcare system], J.O. (French law designed to increase the
number of organ donations in part by requiring explicit refusal—constituted of the submission of a form and
proof of identity— to opt out of organ donation); Par Anne-Aël Durand, Don D’organes: Que Change la
Nouvelle Mesure Sur le Refus Explicite? [Organ Donation: What Does the New Measure on Explicit Refusal
Change?], LE MONDE (December 22, 2016), https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/12/22/don5
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personalized interactions. And businesses—once they establish the default settings that
apply within their platforms—may devise painstaking mechanics for opt-out, so that more
consumers stick with the business’s preferred settings. 12
We think that mechanical costs alone provide a poor foundation for the theory of default
rules, and we introduce an additional, arguably more important, factor affecting opt-out –
information costs. A decision to opt-out is based on the parties’ perceptions concerning the
existence and relative value of the alternatives. People need information about the default,
its value, and how it compares to the (sometimes obscure) non-default options. 13 Such
information can be very costly to acquire. Indeed, information costs could greatly exceed
the mechanical opt-out costs. The presence of information costs and the decisions made in
their shadow produce a novel theory of default rules.
Consider the canonical example of retirement savings. Mechanical opt-out costs are
relatively small—just another check-the-box selection during job enrollment. But
information costs could be substantial. People have to project their lifetime income and
evaluate their future consumption needs. An intensive session of financial counseling is
required to make a good opt-out decision. 14 Likewise, in many other contexts—data
sharing, overdraft protection, add-on rental-car insurance—mechanical costs are a mere
“click,” but the information needed to click smartly is complex and expensive to acquire.
Focusing on information costs as the primary impediment to optimal opt-out forces us to
rethink the notion of stickiness. It is widely thought that high information costs—like high
“mechanical” costs—prevent opt-out. For instance, according to Sunstein, “there is strong
evidence that a lack of information on the part of choosers, including a lack of information
d-organe-quarante-ans-apres-la-loi-sur-le-consentement-presume-ou-en-est-on_5053129_4355770.html.
See also Ryan Nakashima, AP Exclusive: Google Tracks Your Movements, AP NEWS (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://apnews.com/f60bc112665b458cb6473d7ee9492932 (an example where Google increased opt-out
costs to make its privacy settings stickier).
12
See Jamie Luguri & Lior Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns (U. of Chi., Public Law Working
Paper No. 719, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3431205.
13
We began to lay the foundation for our information-costs theory in Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar,
Optimal Defaults in Consumer Markets, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S137 (2016). For a different notion of information
costs as an impediment to opt out, focusing on asymmetric information, see, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Social
Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59, 70 (1993) (“A party may be reluctant to
suggest varying a particular default rule even if the ‘direct transaction costs’ are low and the variation would
make both parties better off . . . [as this] might be interpreted as a signal that the party suggesting the
modification is more likely than previously thought to rely on this legal rights . . . .”); Jason Scott Johnston,
Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 617 (1990)
(“… to bargain around this default, the promisor must convey information which is generally directly
contrary to his strategic interest in bargaining with the default.”); Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts
and Signalling, 23 RAND J. ECON. 432, 432–33 (1992) (“[A]n individual may refrain from including a
particular clause is a contract in order to signal his type.”); see generally Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E.
Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006).
14
See Joshua Blumenstock, Michael Callen, and Tarek Ghani, Why Do Defaults Affect Behavior?
Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan, 108 AMER. ECON. REV. 2868, 2871 (2018) (finding substantial
increases in opt-outs from the default contribution rate after employees receive a financial consultation);
Beshears et al., supra note 10, at 231 ( “[A] significant portion of the effort cost [of opting out] consists of
figuring out the implications of alternative choices.”).
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about alternatives, helps to account for the power of defaults.” 15 This is an alluring
conjecture: why would people initiate any opt-out unless they have information driving
them to do so? Without information, it is thought, people stick to the default. But there is
another possibility. High information costs may stop people from becoming informed, but
may not stop them from opting out! We develop the idea of “uninformed opt-out”—where
due to high information costs people remain uninformed but nevertheless decide to
affirmatively opt out, based on their perceptions about the relative value of the alternatives.
We call such default rules “slippery”—not only do they not stick, but they prompt people
to descend from them without the traction of informed deliberation. This suggests an
important caveat: stickiness is an artifact of high mechanical costs, not of high information
costs. Accordingly, if mechanical costs are low and information costs high, default rules
would be less sticky and more slippery than otherwise hoped, vulnerable to uninformed
opt-out.
Uninformed opt-out is indeed prevalent. Returning to the retirement savings example:
Retirement savings defaults are perhaps the archetypal sticky defaults. And yet mounting
evidence suggests that they are quite slippery, especially over time. The traditional zero
contribution rate (or no enrollment) default triggered an opt out rate of approximately 60%.
And a similar percentage of employees opted out from the predominant 3% contribution
rate default. 16 Much of this wholesale opt out was uninformed. This is not to say that
employees did not acquire any information; of course they did – some more, others less.
But even the better-informed employees fell far short of the full information required for
this complex, financial decision. Most employees had an uninformed, or partially informed,
sense that a zero percent or 3% contribution is not right for them, but their lack of
information did not stop them from opting out.

See Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 20 (2013). See also Jeffrey R. Brown,
Anne M. Farrell, and Scott J. Weisbenner, The Downside of Defaults (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Unpublished Working Paper, 2011) (“…lack of adequate information about decision alternatives is a
significant driver of the likelihood of default… information problems are especially important.”); Cass R.
Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159,
1197-98, 1201 (2003) (“[I]n many domains, people's preferences are labile and ill-formed, and hence starting
points and default rules are likely to be quite sticky.”).
16
On the opt-out rate from the no enrollment default, see, e.g., William E. Nessmith, Stephen P. Utkus, &
Jean A. Young, Measuring the Effectiveness of Automatic Enrollment, 31 Vanguard Center for Retirement
Research, 1, 10 (2007) (showing that voluntary enrollment increased from 32% to 59% over the course of
the first three years of employment); Vanguard, How America Saves (2019), p. 35 (the participation rate in
voluntary enrollment, i.e., zero default, plans was 60%). On the opt-out rate from automatic enrollment plans,
see, e.g., Nessmith et al, id., p. 11 (“after 30 months, 57% of the employees hired under automatic enrollment
[] have a rate higher than the default.” [about half of the automatic enrollment plans featured automatic annual
increases in the contribution rate; we are assuming that the “rate higher than the default” finding means higher
than the annually-adjusted default]). On the predominant contribution rate default of 3%, see id. at 6 (“The
median contribution rate in automatic enrollment designs is 2.9%.”); Vanguard, HAS2019, p. 40 (noting the
predominant 3% default). See also Part III.C. below.
[Vanguard, HAS2019, p. 40 (in automatic enrollment plans, with the predominant 3% default, the average
contribution rate was 6.7%, as compared to a 7.1% contribution rate in voluntary enrollment, i.e., zero default,
plans); p. 35 (the participation rate in voluntary enrollment, i.e., zero default, plans was 60%; the participation
rate in automatic enrollment plans was 91%).
15
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Or, take another example: overdrafts. In the past, a bank customer with no money in her
checking account could still swipe her debit card and make a purchase. The banks called
this “overdraft protection” and charged a hefty fee for the service. Worried about harm to
consumers from these fees, the Federal Reserve Board, in 2010, set a no-overdraftprotection default. And yet of the frequent overdrafters, the group that policymakers were
most concerned about, 45% opted out. 17 Here too the opt out was largely uninformed.
Examples like this abound. Every sales contract contains a default (implied) warranty, but
they are massively disclaimed in fine print. Every digital product is subject to privacy rules
that govern by default, but so often contracted around in the vendors’ terms of service. In
all these scenarios, opt outs occur. They are by and large uninformed.
The first main theoretical contribution of this article is to recognize and analyze uninformed
opt-outs. Defaults are everywhere, and opt-outs from these defaults are common. It is
implausible to imagine that all opt-out decisions are or could ever be informed, given the
staggering amounts of information that would be needed. Indeed, evidence suggests that
many opt-out decisions are not only uninformed but in fact mistaken (or driven by
cognitive biases), making people worse off. Consumers opt out of the default designed to
protect them from high overdraft fees, without fully appreciating the financial
consequences. Internet users opt out of the default designed to protect their privacy, without
realizing how their personal information will be used. Employees opt out of the default
contribution to their retirement plan, without understanding the effect on their retirement
income. And so on. 18 Elsewhere, uninformed opt-out could also be fully rational. It is quite
possible, for example, that people rationally allow firms to collect some personal
information (thus opting out from the no-collection default), or to disclaim an implied
warranty. Such opt-out behavior may be privately optimal, given the rational choice to
remain uninformed, especially when information costs are high. Despite this prevalence of
uninformed opt-out, the phenomenon has received surprisingly little, if any, attention. We
identify the conditions for uninformed opt-out, and explain when it might be harmful and
how it ought to affect the design of default rules.
The second theoretical contribution of the information costs theory is to highlight the
effects of the default rule on information acquisition. The content of the default, we show,
influences the incentives to acquire information. This, in turn, drives people’s decisions to
engage in informed or uninformed opt-out. Here, too, people’s misinformation and
irrational beliefs may distort their choice to acquire information and their resulting opt-out
decisions. Recognizing these effects should play a role in the design of default rules. The
information-forcing effect that we identify is different from the widely studied notion of
penalty defaults. 19 The standard account addresses scenarios of asymmetric information,
and advocates for default rules that force an informed contracting party to reveal
See
CFPB,
CFPB
Study
of
Overdraft
Programs,
at
29-30
(June
2013),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_whitepaper_overdraft-practices.pdf (last visited on Nov.
25, 2019). See also Part III.A. below.
18
See infra Part III (where we discuss applications).
19
For the standard accounts of penalty or information-forcing defaults, see Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk and Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule
of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991).
17

6
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3582129

information to another, uninformed contracting party. Our information-cost theory
addresses a different problem. First, ours is not a theory of contract; it applies to a single
decisionmaker that needs to decide whether or not to opt out of a default. Second, and
related, our analysis does not assume asymmetry of information. It focuses on a single,
uninformed party. The default rule does not force one party to reveal information to another;
it induces uninformed parties to invest more in learning about themselves and how they
would be affected by the default and non-default options.
The third theoretical contribution is a refinement of the standard majoritarian principle.
The conventional approach assumes that mechanical costs are meaningful but not
prohibitive, and thus to minimize these mechanical opt-out costs it advocates defaults that
mimic the preferences of the majority. This approach is a good fit for environments with
low information costs, where people with counter-preferences commit an informed opt-out.
By contrast, when information costs are high, such selective opt-out does not occur, but
the potential for uninformed opt-out suggests that the optimal default option is the one with
the highest expected value (or perceived expected value), which minimizes the incidence
and cost of uninformed opt-out. Both scenarios are unified under a general principle that
prescribes a default that fits the majority preferences given the majority’s information. In
that sense, we still recommend majoritarian defaults, recognizing that the majority may act
upon uninformed beliefs. 20
The value of this refined criterion is at full display when we consider the “intermediate”
information costs case, where people may choose to become informed under some default
rules, but not others. In this region, sometimes a default rule that induces more information
acquisition is superior, as it results in more tailored choices. But sometimes a default rule
that does not induce any information acquisition is preferable. This may happen when the
cost of information outweighs its value. Getting people to become informed, we show, is
not necessarily better!
Information acquisition is a key ingredient in our model, and we recognize various ways
in which it might occur. Apart from deliberate investment in information, people may
acquire information through the efforts of the default setter or of interested third parties
(e.g., when a firm “recommends” a particular choice). Importantly, people may glean
information from the default option itself. This will happen, when they are unsure about
their own information or think that the default-setter has better information. Here, the
default-setter can influence opt-out and information-acquisition decisions. We should be
especially worried about such “endorsement effects” when the default-setter does not have
people’s best-interest in mind.

Our refined notion of majoritarian defaults minimizes opt-out costs – the costs of informed opt-out in the
low-information-costs case and the costs of uninformed opt-out in the high-information-costs case. Thaler
and Sunstein’s proposed rule-of-thumb for default choice is ‘minimize opt-out frequency.’ See Richard H.
Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003). And Bernheim et al.
show that this rule-of-thumb fairs well in certain cases. See B. Douglas Bernheim, Andrey Fradkin & Igor
Popov, The Welfare Economics of Default Options in 401(k) Plans, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2798 (2015). But
they do not distinguish between informed and uninformed opt-out.
20
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A central payoff of the information cost theory is to shed new light on, and suggest a
reevaluation of, Nudge-type libertarian paternalistic ideas, and in particular the stickydefaults paradigm. Regulation through defaults is premised on the expectation that less
sophisticated people would stick with the default, while the more sophisticated are free to
opt out. 21 But what counts as sophistication? If it is a proxy for low information costs, we
show that libertarian paternalistic sorting could be defeated by uninformed opt out. Even
unsophisticated people, with high information costs, may opt out of the default. 22 This
explanation helps bridge an uncomfortable gap between the academic appetite for sticky
default rules and the reality of slippery defaults. 23 It is the overlooked phenomenon of
uninformed opt-out that accounts for the unintended slipperiness of so many default rules.
Indeed, the information-costs theory provides a novel account of stickiness with surprising
implications: we show that low information costs could increase stickiness, and that high
information costs could reduce stickiness—a counterintuitive effect that prior accounts of
stickiness did not recognize. 24
The information costs theory complements conventional, behavioral accounts of default
rules, but also qualifies them. Behavioralists have recognized a type of information costs—
the “cognitive costs” associated with identifying optimal choice 25—as contributing to the
stickiness of defaults. But they mistakenly view information costs as simply another type
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH,
AND HAPPINESS, 42 (Yale Univ. Press 2008) (“Most of the time, nudging helps those who need help while

21

imposing minimal costs on those who do not.”); Ryan Bubb and Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral
Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1598-99 (2014) (“ . . . the default is designed
to put those who stay with the default in the best position but to enable those with different preferences, more
sophistication, greater resources, or other appropriate bases to opt out and choose whatever they prefer.”);
Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein and Ted O’Donoghue, Regulation for
Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for Asymmetric Paternalism, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211,
1225 (2003) (“As long as actively making a choice requires very little effort, the choice of defaults has
essentially no effect on fully rational consumers. But for boundedly rational people who have a status quo
bias, the choice of defaults is important.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 249, 257 (2006) (“ . . . interventions that are choice-preserving (and hence libertarian) are generally
asymmetrical, because they are not likely to impose significant costs on people who do not suffer from
bounded rationality.”).
22
Arguably, the libertarian paternalists would reject our attempt to link sophistication and information. They
may argue that behavioral forces, not information costs, explain the stickiness of defaults. For further
discussion about the relationship between information costs and behavioral forces – see Part VII below.
23
Writers in the area of contract law have long recognized that stickiness is rare and opt-out is exceedingly
common. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 190-92 (2014); Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults,
80 CHI. L. REV. 1155 (2013).
24
Existing accounts of stickiness include (1) effort costs, (2) an “endorsement effect” – trust in a benevolent
default setter, (3) unawareness of the default and of the option to opt out, (4) an anchoring effect (the default
as anchor), (5) loss aversion with the default as the reference point, (6) the default disproportionately features
in the limited choice sets that individuals consider, and (7) cognitive dissonance. See B. Douglas Bernheim
& Dmitry Taubinsky, Behavioral Public Economics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF BEHAV. ECON. – FOUNDATIONS AND
APPLICATIONS 381 (B. Douglas Bernheim, Stefano DellaVigna & David Laibson eds., 2018) (surveying the
literature on sticky default rules in the context of retirement savings); Beshears et al., supra note 10.
25
Blumenstock et al., supra note 14, at 2871 (“[D]efault effects in savings persist because employees face
significant cognitive costs associated with identifying their optimal contribution rate, and that this cost,
together with present-biased preferences, creates procrastination.”).
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of mechanical opt-out costs. 26 While both information costs and mechanical costs affect
the opt-out decision, they do so through different channels. In essence, people face two
decisions: whether to acquire information, and whether to opt out and incur the mechanical
costs. The behavioral literature flattens this two-stage process, collapsing the two types of
costs into a single dimension. This mischaracterization leads the behavioral literature astray.
It invokes myopia to explain stickiness. But, as we show, the main effect of myopia is to
prevent people from acquiring information, not from opting out. The drive to find
behavioral explanations for stickiness also obscures the nuanced role of misperceptions
and how they might instead make the default slippery. We analyze these rich and
underappreciated effects of misperception. Moreover, our information costs theory does
not take any cognitive biases as fixed. It emphasizes that acquisition of information, which
is affected by the default choice, can minimize the effects of misperception.
Finally, our analysis lays a novel and much needed foundation for a new consumer antimanipulation law. Policymakers and commentators are increasingly concerned about ways
in which firms manipulate consumers’ choices. It has nevertheless proven challenging to
distinguish such manipulations from the multitude of other permissible techniques used by
firms to influence consumers’ choices, such as most advertising campaigns, product shelf
placement, and firms’ sales recommendations. Our theoretical framework can help address
this challenge. The distinction between mechanical costs and information costs imposes
conceptual order on many potentially manipulative practices. Some of these practices are
designed to increase mechanical costs, making it unnecessarily hard for consumers to keep
the protective legal defaults, and all too easy to opt-into the firm’s preferred, non-default
option. Terms like “sludge” and “dark patterns” are sometimes used to describe such
practices. 27 A different set of practices is designed to increase information costs, e.g., by
peddling falsehoods or half-truths or by hiding important information in a haze of complex
details. (Some of these practices are covered by false advertising and anti-deception laws;
others are not.) For both of these categories – practices that increase mechanical costs and
practices that increase information costs – our theory identifies those practices that reduce
efficiency and harm consumers and should thus be prohibited as manipulation.
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows. Part II develops our information-cost
theory of defaults. Part III considers different sources of information and beliefs. Part IV
discusses the different regulatory implications of information costs and mechanical costs.
Part V offers a more detailed analysis of several applications – policy domains where
default rules play a key role: overdraft protection, privacy, retirement savings and “green”
defaults. The Conclusion considers some of the assumptions underlying the analysis,
specifically, what information policymakers need to apply the information-costs theory in
the design of default rules.

26
See, e.g., Beshears et al., supra note 10 (suggesting that “a significant portion of the effort cost [of opting
out] consists of figuring out the implications of alternative choices.”).
27
See, e.g., Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 3; Cass R. Sunstein, Sludges and Ordeals, 68 DUKE L.J.
1843 (2019); Richard H. Thaler, Nudge, Not Sludge, 361 SCIENCE 431 (2018). The term “sludge” refers more
narrowly to frictions, whereas the term “dark patterns” is broader.
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II. A Theory of Information Costs and Default Rules
A. A Simple Model
We present here a theoretical illustration of the relationship between information costs and
default rules. The analysis is presented through a numeric example. 28 Section 1 presents
the framework of the analysis, and Section 2 demonstrates the conventional perfect
information case, as a benchmark for the imperfect information analysis in Sections 3 and
4. Section 3 assumes that all uninformed parties have accurate beliefs about the distribution
of types. Section 4 relaxes the accurate beliefs assumption.
1. Framework of Analysis
We consider a setting in which there are two possible arrangements, “High” and “Low”. A
typical issue addressed by default rules is the degree of protection to individuals, where
High denotes more protection relative to Low—for example, a broader warranty, a higher
pension savings rate, or greater privacy protection. Because the choice High v. Low could
affect other aspects of the transaction (like price), people vary in how they value the two
arrangements. We assume that 60% of the population are better off with Low, and we call
them “Type 1.” 40% of the population are better off with High, and are called “Type 2.”
Let’s use numbers to reflect the valuations assigned:

High
Low

Type 1
(60%)
𝑣𝑣 = −10

Type 2
(40%)
𝑣𝑣 = 20

𝑣𝑣 = 0

Table 1: The Example – Setup

𝑣𝑣 = 0

To make the example simple, and without loss of generality, we assumed that everyone
assigns value v = 0 to Low. For Type 1, High is worse; they assign a value of v = -10 to
High. And for Type 2, High is better; they assign a value of v = 20 to High. People can opt
out of the default by incurring a “small” mechanical cost, 1. This cost is set to be non-zero
but sufficiently low that any party would opt out from an unattractive default. In addition,
people may invest some cost to acquire information about their type, if they don’t already
know it. One aspect of this example should be noted at the outset. Most people are better
off with Low: 60% versus 40%. But higher expected welfare is obtained under High:

28

A more formal and general derivation of the propositions is provided in the Appendix.
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60%*(-10) + 40%*(20) = 2 under High versus 0 under Low. This duality will be critical to
our analysis, which is aimed at identifying which rule is superior.
2. Perfect Information
In the perfect information benchmark, everyone knows their type. If the default rule is
unattractive to them, they opt out. With a Low default, Type 2 individuals opt out and
average social welfare is: 𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.4 ∙ (20 − 1) + 0.6 ∙ 0 = 7.6. With a High default,
Type 1 individuals opt out and average social welfare is: 𝑊𝑊𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ = 0.4 ∙ 20 + 0.6 ∙ (−1) =
7.4. 29 Comparing social welfare under the two defaults, we see that Low is the better
default, because it generates fewer costly opt-outs. This is the standard result that, with
perfect information, the majoritarian default is the best. We now turn to the imperfect
information case, where this standard result will be qualified.
3. Imperfect Information
Assume that individuals do not know their type, but can invest some fixed cost to find out.
What they do know, even without investing, is the distribution of types: they know that 60%
are Type 1 and 40% are Type 2. They can therefore calculate the average value of the two
provisions, Low and High. The expected value of Low is 0. The expected value of High
is 0.6 ∙ (−10) + 0.4 ∙ 20 = 2. (The assumption that people know expected values but do
not know their “type” is a common analytical representation of imperfect information. The
term “type” should not be taken literally; it simply represents the information that people
do not have.) Accordingly, based solely on such average valuations, people prefer High. 30
And if the default is set at Low, and people remain uninformed, they will want to opt out
to High. Given the assumption that the mechanical opt-out cost is 1 (< 2), when the default
is Low such “uninformed opt-out” will occur.
Uninformed opt-out decisions (or uninformed decisions not to opt out) will determine
outcomes when the cost of becoming informed is high. When information costs are lower,
individuals may decide to acquire information and thereby make the opt-out decision in a
fully informed manner, knowing their actual types. 31 Let us examine how people would
behave, and the resulting social welfare, under the two defaults.

We calculated welfare for a representative individual. To asses overall social welfare we would need to
multiply these values by the number of individuals who are subject to the default rule.
30
We assume that individuals are risk neutral and thus focus on expected values.
31
Note that when information is acquired, there will always be some level of informed opt-out, as long as
the opt-out cost is sufficiently low (and some parties fair better with the non-default option). When
information is not acquired, and the only possible opt-out is uninformed opt-out, there may be no opt-out at
all, even with very low opt-out costs. Specifically, there will be no uninformed opt-out unless the expected
(net) benefit of the default is smaller than the expected (net) benefit of the non-default option.
29
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Low Default. The first decision people face is whether or not to acquire information. 32 The
value of information is
𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = [0.4 ∙ (20 − 1)] − [2 − 1] = 6.6

The first component represents the payoff with perfect information: if an individual
acquires information, she has a 40% chance of learning that she is Type 2; she will then
opt out of the Low default, incurring an opt-out cost of 1, and earn a payoff of 20. (There
is a 60% chance that the individual will learn that she is Type 1 and stick with the Low
default, earning 0.) The second component represents the payoff of an uninformed
individual: the individual will opt out – an uninformed opt-out – and earn an expected
payoff of 2 while incurring an opt-out cost of 1. The value of acquiring information is the
difference between the payoff with versus without information, and it equals 6.6. When
information costs are below 6.6, the individual will acquire information.
It is interesting to note that, under the Low default, high information costs reduce both
stickiness and welfare. Higher information costs make it less likely that people will become
informed and selectively opt out. Instead, they opt out non-selectively, uninformed. At the
same time, high information costs reduce welfare, because they eliminate a “separating”
outcome in which different people choose the outcome most suitable to them.
High Default. Under a High default, the value of information is
𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ = [0.6 ∙ (−1) + 0.4 ∙ 20] − [2] = 5.4

The first component represents the payoff with perfect information: if an individual
acquires information, she has a 60% chance of learning that she is Type 1; she will then
opt out of the High default, incurring an opt-out cost of 1, and earning 0 instead of -10. The
individual also has a 40% chance of learning that she is Type 2, and she will then stick with
the High default and earn 20. The second component represents the payoff of an
uninformed individual: Since the expected value of High (2) is larger than the expected
value of Low (0), there will be no (uninformed) opt-out, and the individual will earn an
expected payoff of 2. Now, when information costs are below 5.4, people will acquire
information.
Welfare Comparison. First, notice that the value of information is greater with Low default
(𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ ), which means that a Low default leads to more acquisition of information.
Why? Primarily because the expected value of the Low default is lower and thus even
without acquiring information people gain by opting out. Information is more valuable with
Low default, because it saves (some of) the costs of these uninformed opt-outs. To amplify,
we rewrite 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 and 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ as follows:
For a general exposition on the economics of information, see Jack Hirshleifer and John G. Riley, The
Analytics of Uncertainty and Information – An Expository Survey, 17 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1375 (1979).
32
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𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = (0.4 ∙ 20 − 2) − 0.4 + 1 = 6.6
𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ = (0.4 ∙ 20 − 2) − 0.6 = 5.4

With both defaults, informed parties get 5 (0.4 ∙ 20) and uninformed parties get 2. The
difference lies in the opt-out costs. With Low default, informed opt-out occurs 40% of the
times (when information is acquired) and uninformed opt-out occurs 100% of the times
(when information is not acquired). Information acquisition thus saves 0.6 in opt-out costs.
With High default, informed opt-out occurs 60% of the times (when information is
acquired) and there is no uninformed opt-out. Information acquisition thus costs 0.6 in optout costs.
It may be thought that a default that induces more information acquisition (Low Default,
in this example) is necessarily better. But, we show, this turns out to be false. Since
information is costly to acquire, it may be better to remain uninformed. 33
We proceed by distinguishing between three ranges of information costs:
(a) Upper range of Information Costs (Larger than 6.6)
When information costs are above a certain threshold, information is not acquired – under
either the Low or the High default. Under Low default, all parties opt out; there is a 100%
opt-out rate – all uninformed opt-out. Under High default, no one opts out; the opt-out rate
is zero. Regardless of the default, all parties end up at the High outcome. Low default is
slippery, whereas High default is sticky. The High default is more efficient, because it
saves the mechanical costs of uninformed opt-out. Generalizing, when information costs
are at the upper range and opt-out costs are small, the optimal default is the one that
maximizes the expected value for uninformed parties. While the High outcome is optimal
for only a minority of individuals, the High default is still majoritarian – it is what the
majority of uninformed individuals, indeed all uninformed individuals, want.
(b) Bottom Range of Information Costs (Smaller than 5.4)
When information costs are below a certain (different) threshold, information is acquired
– under both the High and the Low default. Under Low default, people who learn that they
are Type 2 opt-out; there is a 40% opt-out rate. Under High default, people who learn that
they are Type 1 opt-out; there is a 60% opt-out rate. All opt-out is informed. Regardless of
the default, people end up with the right match – Type 1 with Low and Type 2 with High.
Here, Low default is stickier. It is also the more efficient rule, because it reduces the cost
of informed opt-out. Generalizing, when information costs are at the bottom range and optout costs are small, the optimal default is the majoritarian one, because it minimizes the
costs of informed opt-out.
For expositional purposes, we compare the default rules without accounting for heterogeneity in
information costs across people. When we allow for such heterogeneity in information costs, the optimal
default will need to balance the different considerations listed above.

33
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(c) Intermediate Range of Information Costs (Between 5.4 and 6.6)
When information costs are intermediate, information is acquired under Low default, but
not under High default. Under Low default, people who learn that they are Type 2 opt-out;
there is a 40% opt-out rate. Under High default, the uninformed individuals stick with the
default; the opt-out rate is zero. High default is stickier. And either rule may be more
efficient. Low default leads to optimal matching (while incurring some opt-out costs),
which generates a value of 0.4 ∙ (20 − 1) = 7.6, but requires costly investment in
information acquisition. With High default, individuals remain uninformed and thus forgo
the optimal matching, but they avoid costly investment in information (as well as opt-out
costs); social welfare equals the average value of 2. Therefore, Low default is more
efficient when information costs are below 5.6 (= 7.6 – 2); otherwise, High default is more
efficient. To summarize: At the lower end of the intermediate range of information costs,
between 5.4 and 5.6, Low default is the more efficient rule; and at the higher end of that
range, between 5.6 and 6.6, High default is the more efficient rule.
Note that, when information costs are at the lower end of the intermediate range, the theory
prescribes Low default, even though High default maximizes expected value. Choosing a
default option that is bad for the uninformed individual induces efficient information
acquisition. In essence, the information costs theory identifies a new type of “penalty
default” or “information-forcing default.”
It is important to explain the difference between our notion of an information-forcing
default and the familiar account of penalty defaults. 34 The standard account of penalty
defaults addresses contracting scenarios with asymmetric information, and advocates
default rules that would force an informed contracting party to reveal its private
information or to otherwise act upon it. Our account, while applicable to contracting
scenarios, is not focused on contracting. We study a single-party, decision-theoretic model,
where an uninformed party decides whether to invest in information acquisition. If acquired,
the information benefits the acquiring party, not some other party. As in the standard
accounts of penalty defaults, our analysis justifies counter-majoritarian rules (given our
refined notion of a majoritarian default). Indeed, when information costs are at the lower
end of the intermediate range, our information-costs theory prescribes Low default,
because it induces parties to acquire information, despite the fact that the majority of
uninformed parties prefer High.
4. Biased Information
So far, people’s beliefs were accurate “on average” – they correctly anticipated the share
of Type 1’s (60%) and the valuations each type would have under either the High or Low
options. We saw that with such accurate beliefs, uninformed opt-out guarantees that people
can do no worse than to maximize the expected payoff, minus opt-out costs, and sometimes
For the standard accounts of penalty or information-forcing defaults, see Ayres and Gertner, supra note 19,
and Bebchuk and Shavell, supra note 19.
34
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can do better. 35 But this is a lot to assume, and we now illustrate how things change when
people’s beliefs are inaccurate. Specifically, we examine a special case in which people
overestimate the likelihood that they are Type 1 to be 80%. 36 To be sure, there are many
other ways in which beliefs could be inaccurate. 37 Here, we merely illustrate how
inaccurate beliefs can change the effects of the different defaults and thus the optimal
default choice.
Upper range of information costs. When information costs are prohibitive, people act
solely on the basis of their beliefs, according to the perceived expected value of each option,
which is now 0 for Low and -4 for High. (The perceived value of High is 0.8 ∙ (−10) +
0.2 ∙ 20 = −4.) If the default is Low, people stick with it—better to keep 0 than pay an
opt-out cost to get -4. If the default is High, people act on their inaccurate beliefs and opt
out uninformed, ending up with a net payoff of -1 (the value of Low, which is 0, minus the
mechanical opt-out cost). Either way, the result is inefficient: either sticking with an
inefficient default when it is Low, or opting out of an efficient default uninformed when it
is High. 38
Here, inaccurate beliefs change the welfare ordering of the two defaults and thus alter our
policy prescriptions. With accurate beliefs, all parties ended up with High, regardless of
the default, and the policy preference for High default was based on the avoidance of optout costs. With inaccurate beliefs, all parties end up with the Low option, regardless of the
default, and it would be better to set the Low default—again, to avoid the waste of opt-out
costs. While the prescription changes, the principle remains the same: When information
costs are at the upper range, set the default that maximizes the expected value that people
believe they will get – even if this belief is inaccurate. Again, this is a majoritarian default
– it gives the majority of individuals, indeed all individuals, what they want, given their
inaccurate uninformed beliefs.
Bottom range of information costs. When information costs are easily affordable, such that
all parties become informed, inaccurate beliefs about the share of Type 1 individuals do
not matter, because people acquire information and do not act upon their beliefs. In other
words, when parties acquire individualized information, beliefs about averages are
irrelevant.
Intermediate information costs. When information costs are intermediate, the key
difference between the two defaults has to do with the relative incentives that they provide
for information acquisition. With accurate beliefs, information was acquired with Low
With accurate beliefs, uninformed opt-out, by definition, maximizes the expected payoff of the individual
who decides to opt out. And, similarly, a decision not to opt out maximizes expected payoffs. The
introduction of inaccurate beliefs allows for inefficient, uninformed opt-out; and for inefficient decisions not
to opt out – to stick with the default.
36
We could assume inaccurate yet unbiased beliefs, such that some parties overestimate the share of Type 1
individuals while others underestimate this share. Or we could allow for inaccurate, biased beliefs, e.g., when
a business invests in manipulating consumer beliefs in order to maximize its profits.
37
We examine the effects of other distortions more thoroughly in the Appendix.
38
With accurate beliefs, High default was sticky, and Low default was slippery. With the inaccurate beliefs,
High default is slippery, and Low default is sticky.
35
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default, but not with High default. Inaccurate beliefs affect the perceived value of
information under the two default rules. With Low default, the perceived value of
information is
𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = [0.2 ∙ (20 − 1)] − [0] = 3.8

The perceived expected payoff if information is acquired decreases relative to the accurate
beliefs case (from 0.4 ∙ (20 − 1) to 0.2 ∙ (20 − 1)). The perceived payoff if information is
not acquired changes, relative to the accurate beliefs case, from the uninformed opt-out
payoff of 1 (= 2 – 1) to the no opt-out payoff, zero.
With High default, the perceived value of information is
𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ = [0.8 ∙ (−1) + 0.2 ∙ 20] − [−1] = 4.2

The perceived expected payoff if information is acquired decreases relative to the accurate
beliefs case (from 0.6 ∙ (−1) + 0.4 ∙ 20 to 0.8 ∙ (−1) + 0.2 ∙ 20). The perceived payoff if
information is not acquired changes, relative to the accurate beliefs case, from the no optout payoff, 2, to the uninformed opt-out payoff of -1.
Now it is High default that provides stronger incentives to acquire information – incentives
that can be particularly important, since individualized information alleviates the need to
rely on inaccurate beliefs about average values. (Still, given the cost of acquiring
information, the stronger incentive to become informed is not necessarily efficient.) 39
It is worth noting that, with inaccurate beliefs, a policy that reduces information costs might
have the counterintuitive effect of reducing social welfare. This effect could happen under
either default rule, and it is due to people’s overestimation of the value of information.
Specifically, lower information costs cause more people to acquire information. With
accurate beliefs, this increased tendency to acquire information is good, because
information is acquired only when the value of the subsequent informed opt-out exceeds
the cost of information. But with inaccurate beliefs people might imagine a benefit from
information that is not real and will then acquire too much information. For example, if the
actual benefit from information is 10 and the misperceived benefit is 20, then people would
inefficiently acquire information that costs anywhere between 10 and 20. If information
costs are high, say 25, the greater tendency to acquire information will not result in
inefficient acquisition of information. But if information costs are reduced to, say, 15,
people will inefficiently invest in information. 40
We also observe that the very definition of low vs. intermediate vs. high information costs changes, as the
cutoff values of information are affected by the inaccurate beliefs.
40
This result does not obtain in our example, where the inaccurate beliefs are limited to an underestimation
of the share of Type 2 individuals (who benefit from High), which leads to a false belief that Low default is
better on average. To get the perverse result that lower information costs reduce welfare, we need an
overestimation of the share of Type 2 individuals and/or the benefit to Type 2 from High outcome – to get
an overestimation of the benefit from acquiring information. And to maintain the assumption that inaccurate
beliefs make Low default seem better, we also need an overestimation of the cost of High to Type 1
individuals.
39
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5. Beyond a Binary Default Choice
For simplicity, our analysis assumed only two outcomes – Low and High, and thus only
two defaults – Low default and High default. In some cases, this binary-choice assumption
is realistic – either you are an organ donor or not, either you have overdraft protection or
not. In other cases, there are multiple options: there are more than two possible privacy
settings and thus more than two possible defaults. Even with organ donations, there can be
more than two options – you may agree to donate some organs but not others. In yet other
cases, the choice is continuous. In the retirement savings example, the choice of
contribution level is a continuous choice.
Our framework can easily be adjusted to accommodate a multiplicity of possible outcomes
and even a continuous outcome space. In the basic, binary model, an individual had to
compare the default option to only one other, non-default option. With multiple outcomes,
the individual would need to compare the default option to several non-default options.
This comparison task would be even more challenging with a continuous outcome space.
Consider the decision process of an employee who faces a specific contribution rate default,
say 3%. The employee would need to calculate an expected payoff function, where the
expected payoff is a function of the continuous contribution rate, and maximize this
function. All of these comparisons – between two options, between multiple discrete
options or between a continuum of options – are, at best, approximated by the individual.
Such rough approximations are sufficient to support the insights generated by the
theoretical model. Still, we acknowledge the added difficulty in assessing the optimal
choice when the number of options is larger. We discuss in the Conclusion the impact of
such informational burdens.
6. Summary
Information costs affect the design of optimal defaults. When information costs are high,
people remain uninformed, but may still choose uninformed opt-out if they can increase
their expected payoff. Thus, the default rule that is optimal when parties are informed—
the one that tracks the informed preferences of the majority—has to be replaced with a rule
that tracks the uninformed preferences of the majority or, put differently, the rule that
maximizes expected payoffs. In both cases, the goal is to minimize the incidence of optout; but while the traditional, low-information-costs analysis focuses on informed opt-out,
when information costs are high we should focus on uninformed opt-out.
Our analysis highlights the distinction between two types of transactions costs –
mechanical costs and information costs – that are often treated interchangeably. The
practical effects of these two types of transactions costs are drastically different. High
mechanical costs can prevent opt out and lead to greater stickiness of defaults. High
information costs, in contrast, do not prevent opt-out and thus do not render the default rule
sticky. This distinction helps explain some of the contracting strategies deployed by firms
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vis-à-vis consumers, and also helps guide lawmakers who seek to optimally intervene in
these environments. We develop these lessons below.
Another insight from our model concerns the incentives of uninformed people to acquire
information about the default and its relative value. Specifically, we saw that when
information costs are positive but not prohibitive, people may choose to incur the
information cost and make informed opt-out decisions. The choice of default affects this
decision, and we identified an “intermediate” range of costs in which people acquire
information under one default rule but not the other. Acquiring more information does not
guarantee more opt-out, because informed people may decide to stick with a default that
the uninformed reject. In this intermediate range, sometimes the default that leads to more
information acquisition is superior, because it guarantees better matching; and other times
the default that leads to less information acquisition is superior, because it saves
information costs.
When people have biased prior beliefs about their type, uninformed opt-out still occurs and
is more likely to result in a bad outcome—the one mistakenly expected to be better on
average. If information costs are high, it is pointless for society to set a default that
maximizes the true expected value, because uninformed people will act upon their biased
beliefs and opt out. This is another implication of uninformed opt-out that prior literature
ignored, and it sets an important practical limit on the social utility of paternalistic default
rules: rather than being sticky, they merely impose opt-out costs. In addition, when
information costs are not prohibitive, biased beliefs may distort people’s decisions to
acquire information. They might waste money acquiring information that they overvalue
(high information costs can helpfully deter such waste – a counterintuitive result); and they
might fail to acquire information that they undervalue. On the bright side, when people
decide to acquire information, the pre-information biases become irrelevant.
B. Distributive Considerations
The possibility of uninformed opt-out forces us to rethink the role of distributive
considerations in designing default rules. If most people are uninformed and stick with the
default, the policymaker could successfully shift resources to a preferred group by choosing
a default that benefits that group, even if the default is less efficient overall. If, instead,
uninformed members of the preferred group recognize the presence of an alternative
arrangement that maximizes the expected value across all groups, and they do not
recognize that the default is nevertheless better for them, then they would opt out and the
policymaker’s distributive objective would be frustrated.
In our numerical example (Section II.A.), a policymaker who prefers the Type 1 group may
choose Low default, even though High default provides overall greater expected value.
This policy, however, would work, only if the uninformed Type 1 individuals stick with
the default. Otherwise, the preferred group would just opt out, to High; and the Low default
would just impose extra opt-out costs on this group. The policymaker who intended to help
Type 1 would only end up hurting them.
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While uninformed opt-out might frustrate some distributive policies, the information-costs
theory suggests other ways to achieve distributive goals. In particular, distributive concerns
can influence default choice, when different people have different information costs.
Choosing a default that induces only some people to acquire information may then be
justified. We saw above that when information costs are large, the optimal default is the
one that maximizes the expected value for uninformed individuals, and when information
costs are small the optimal default tracks the preferences of the informed majority. But
what if poor people have greater information costs than the affluent? In that case, choosing
a default based on the assumption that information costs are high could be justified.
C. The Information Cost Theory Versus Behavioral Accounts of Defaults
The theory of opt out from default rules presented in Part II.A focuses attention on the
importance of information and information costs. It shows that costly information may not
stop opt out from occurring, although it would affect the opt out choices people make. The
possibility of uninformed opt out has the potential to explain how unsophisticated parties
respond to defaults.
This is not the first attempt to find order in people’s uninformed response to default rules.
Different behavioral theories have been proposed. But while these behavioral theories have
focused on explaining the stickiness of defaults, our information-costs theory explains why
many defaults remain slippery. Our analysis is not intended to replace existing behavioral
accounts of default rules. It does, however, qualify and shed new light on their conclusions.
1. Present Bias and Procrastination
One of the most prominent accounts of default effects relies on the behavioral notions of
myopia, present bias and procrastination. Even if the non-default option is better, the
benefit from switching is in the future, whereas the cost of switching is in the present. Thus,
the myopic or present-biased individual will defer the costly switching until the next period,
and when the next period arrives to the period after that, and so forth. A standard pattern
of procrastination emerges, and the individual ends up with the inefficient default.
The problem with this standard procrastination story is that it requires a switching cost that
present biased individuals wish to postpone. The “mechanical” opt-out costs, in many cases,
are too small to support the procrastination story. Information costs, on the other hand, can
be much larger – definitely a cost that a present biased individual would want to postpone.41
If information is costly, a present biased individual may remain uninformed, even when a
rational individual would acquire the information. And if the optimal, uninformed choice
is to stick with the default, this combination of information costs and present bias explain
See Blumenstock et al., supra note 14, at 2871 (concluding that “default effects in savings persist because
employees face significant cognitive costs associated with identifying their optimal contribution rate, and
that this cost, together with present-biased preferences, creates procrastination”).

41
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the stickiness of defaults. To be sure, the information-costs theory can explain stickiness
even without the behavioral add-on, but the interaction between the two accounts generates
even more stickiness.
The procrastination story needs information costs. But adding information costs forces a
revision of the standard procrastination story. This is a story of sticky defaults – defaults
are sticky, because switching is costly and this cost is postponed, indefinitely. The
information costs theory teaches that a present biased individual may postpone the costly
act of acquiring information and thus remain uninformed. When uninformed individuals
prefer the default option, procrastination produces sticky defaults. But when uninformed
individuals prefer the non-default option, procrastination results in uninformed opt-out and
slippery defaults. Scholars, such as Joshua Blumenstock, Michael Callen, and Tarek
Ghani, 42 and John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian,43
conclude that present bias, with information costs, generates stickiness, because they
consider information costs as just another species of opt-out costs. Our information costs
theory emphasizes the qualitative difference between information costs and “mechanical”
opt-out costs. It is this difference that explains how present bias can result in slippery, not
sticky, defaults.
2. Optimism
In some applications, optimism has been suggested as an explanation for the stickiness of
defaults. Consider the overdraft protection example. Before the 2010 rule change, the
‘overdraft protection’ default was quite sticky. (This default allowed individuals to
overdraw their checking account, and allowed the bank to charge a fee for each overcharge.)
Arguably, this stickiness could have been attributed to people’s optimism, specifically,
their underestimation of the likelihood that they would incur multiple overdraft fees. (And
after the rule change, the relative slipperiness of the ‘no protection’ default may be
attributed to the same optimism.) 44
The optimism account interacts with our information costs theory on two dimensions. First,
optimism is an example of a misperception affecting the relative (net) benefit of the default
and non-default options – the type of misperception incorporated into our theory. In this
sense, the information costs theory generalizes the standard optimism story. But this is not
an “innocuous” generalization; it is a generalization that highlights the limits of the
standard account. Specifically, the optimism story assumes that the bias favors the default
option. Our theory allows for misperceptions that favor either the default option or the non42

See id.
See Beshears et al., supra note 10.
44
Willis (2013), supra note 23, at 1183 (“As regulators noted in promulgating the overdraft default,
consumers are likely to assume overoptimistically they will not overdraw.” Citing 74 Fed Reg at 59044.);
see also Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, VAND. L. REV. 1653,
1659 (1998) (“An amazingly robust finding about human actors—and an important contributor to the
phenomenon of risk estimation—is that people are often unrealistically optimistic about the probability that
bad things will happen to them.”); see generally TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS, A TOUR OF THE
IRRATIONALLY POSITIVE BRAIN (2011).
43
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default option. This is an important practical expansion, because the legal default is often
presented in a manner that triggers pessimism—an exaggerated likelihood of a negative
event—to induce adherence to the default, especially in consumer markets where sellers
profit from consumers’ choice of non-default add-ons. For this reason, our stickiness result
is more circumscribed.
More important, while the standard account assumes that optimism will always affect the
individual’s stick-or-switch decision, our information costs theory emphasizes the limits
of optimism. Optimism, we show, is a function of information. It affects the uninformed,
but not the informed. More generally, the more information you have, the less room there
is for bias such as optimism to take hold. 45 The information costs theory helps
policymakers identify the default rule that will induce more acquisition of information and
thus minimize the effects of optimism.46
3. Anchors and Reference Points
A third set of behavioral explanations focus on defaults as anchors or reference points.
Behavioral economists have shown that asking people to consider an arbitrary number (an
“anchor”) will bias subsequent judgments and estimations towards this number. 47 The
default option may serve as an “anchor.” A related, behavioral literature has emphasized
the importance of reference points, against which decision makers evaluate gains and
losses. This literature has also demonstrated that many individuals are loss averse, and
experience losses more strongly than commensurate gains. 48 If the default option becomes
the reference point and relative costs of the non-default option loom larger than relative
gains from the non-default option, then decision-makers will tend to stick to the default. 49
These behavioral explanations presume a rather sparse informational environment, where
the default rule is the only possible anchor or reference point. Our information costs theory
OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER
MARKETS 9 (2012).
46
The information-costs theory also shows how misperception, like optimism, can distort the decision
whether to acquire information. See supra Secs. II.A.4 and IV.A.
47
The anchoring effect was first identified by Tversky and Kahneman in Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). In the retirement savings
context, James J. Choi et al., Small Cues Change Savings Choices, 142 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR 379 (2017) and
Gopi Shah Goda, Colleen Flaherty Manchester, & Aaron J. Sojourner, What Will My Account Really Be
Worth? Experimental Evidence on How Retirement Income Projections Affect Saving,” 119 J. PUBLIC ECON.
80 (2014) show that employees raise their 401(k) contribution rates if they are exposed to arbitrary high
contribution examples in communications. See also B. Douglas Bernheim, Andrey Fredkin, & Igor Popov,
The Welfare Economics of Default Options in 401(k) Plans, AM. ECON. REV. 2798 (2015). This account is
based on the literature review in Beshears et al., supra note 10, at Ch. X.
48
See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (developing Prospect Theory that emphasizes the importance of reference points
and identifies loss aversion).
49
Moreover, Kahneman and Tversky argue that negative consequences of action (like affirmatively opting
out of the default) are felt more strongly than negative consequences of inaction (like sticking with the
default). See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, 246 SCI. AMER. 160
(1982). This would make the default option even stickier.
45
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highlights the possibility that individuals will acquire information before making the stickor-switch decision. If individuals decide to acquire more information, then the salience of
the default option would likely diminish. Allowing for such a richer informational
environment, the anchoring or reference point explanations would predict a reduction in
stickiness. In contrast, under the information-costs theory, more information can either
increase or decrease stickiness. 50

III. Sources of Information and Beliefs
The theory presented in this Article identifies information and beliefs as key factors that
affect opt out decisions. Part II analyzed a framework in which people did not know their
type, but were able at some cost to discover it. In the absence of specific information, we
said that people were uninformed in the sense that they held onto prior beliefs—sometimes
accurate on average but other times biased.
In the next two Parts we explore the relevance of these findings to several central questions
surround the design of default rules. First, Part III takes the theoretical building block of
information costs and beliefs and expands the lens to examine various factors that are
captured by these concepts. What are the information costs that people can spend to become
informed? What are the prior beliefs, and what drives them towards accuracy or bias? Later,
in Part IV, we turn to the other feature of the model—the difference between mechanical
and information costs—and explore regulatory implications arising from it.
A. Deliberate Investment in Information
Our basic model assumed that individuals deliberately weigh the cost of information
acquisition against the benefit, or perceived benefit, of information. When the cost is small
and the benefit (or perceived benefit) is large, individuals make a deliberate investment in
information. Such acquisitions of information can take different forms.
Consider the retirement savings context. Individuals can invest more or less time
researching the default and non-default options. They can read brochures or attend
webinars sponsored by their employer. They can study third-party materials that explain
the implications of higher versus lower contributions to a retirement account. And they
sometimes discuss the question of optimal savings with colleagues, friends and family
members. Individuals can also spend actual money on information. They can pay financial
advisors who will explain the retirement savings options and help devise an optimal savings
plan. 51
See supra Secs. II.A and IV.A.
In 2019, almost 13,000 SEC-registered investment advisors managed $83.7 trillion for 43 million clients,
including $10.5 trillion invested for individual clients who are 94.6% of the total, 43 million clients. With a
1% fee, individuals paid $105 billion for investment advice. See National Regulatory Services and
50
51
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Retirement savings is a decision of great importance that people make one time (or once
every few years), often with the benefit of some accessible advice. It pays to make a
deliberate investment in information in this setting. There are other decisions that fall into
this category. When buying property insurance, policyholders are offered a basic coverage
default (“Low”), to which they can add supplemental coverages like a hurricane
endorsement or coverage for damages from flooding (“High”). When purchasing big ticket
items, buyers have to decide about adding extended warranties. In many transactions,
buyers face a choice to extend the withdrawal period (for example, making an airline ticket
refundable) by paying a premium. When these decisions arise, people are usually
uniformed about the relative value of the add-ons, but have plenty of opportunity to acquire
more information.
Some of the information that people deliberately acquire comes in the form of comparison
shopping. Can an extended warranty be purchased more cheaply elsewhere? Other
information can be teased out of the fine print. Under what conditions can the consumer
withdraw from a “refundable” transaction? And some information comes from advice—
for example, what coverages are critical to add to one’s insurance policy.
Deliberate investment in information is probably more common when the stakes are large.
In numerous other contexts, opt out decisions have to be made in day-to-day transactions,
each of which contains a long list of opt outs. For example, opt out is common in the data
privacy context. People can spend time studying the legal rules that provide default
protections or firms’ privacy policies that qualify these protections. But, realistically, most
people will spend little (or no) time studying legal rules and reading privacy policies,
leaving them with imprecise information. And, yet, when a particular issue (like data
collection) comes up in multiple contexts, people may divert some attention to
understanding the value of opt out. People might read newspaper articles about how firms
use their data and reports about data breaches and their consequences. They may even
consult with tech-savvy acquaintances. True, they are unlikely to have accurate information
to evaluate the opt out options in each individual transaction, to support a truly informed
decision. And even if they spend time and money trying to become informed, they might
end up with inaccurate or even misleading information – not all the information available
on the internet is properly vetted, and not all “expert advisers” are really expert advisers.
Still, some consumers would immerse themselves more than others, acquire better
information and make more informed decisions.
While the model in Section II.A identified the information cost as a parameter that
characterizes each transaction, it is important to recognize that information costs interact
across transactions. As the number and frequency of opt out decisions accumulate, people
have to divide their attention across more contexts, and are thus able to acquire information
only in those areas that really matter. Part of the information problem that people solve,
then, is not only how much to invest in each case, but how to prioritize. Like the decision
Investment Adviser Association, 2019 Evolution Revolution: A Profile of the Investment Adviser Profession
(2019) (available at: https://www.investmentadviser.org/publications/evolution-revolution). The vast
majority (95.5%) of fees paid to investment advisors are billed as a percentage of assets under management.
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to opt out, the decision to prioritize can be made with the benefit of some investment in
“meta”-information, or it can be made uninformed. For example, having learned – from an
employer or from a third party – about the importance of retirement savings, an individual
will make an informed (or more informed) choice to prioritize the decision whether to opt
out from the retirement savings default and to pay less attention to, say, an offer to buy an
insurance add-on.
Even when deliberate investment in information is unrealistic, there are other ways to
become informed. In the following discussion, we examine these alternative sources of
information. We also explore people’s beliefs (about the expected values of the default and
non-default options) and the information they use to shape these beliefs.
B. “Endorsement Effects”: The Informational Content of Defaults
Thus far we focused on deliberate investments in information acquisition. But an
information theory of defaults must account for another channel through which decisionmakers can become informed. People can glean information from the chosen default option
itself. Consider a benevolent employer who sets a default retirement savings contribution
rate that, according to the employer’s expert opinion (formed after consulting with
retirement savings professionals), maximizes the expected value for her employees. If
employees believe that their employer has set the default option in this fashion—perhaps
because they believe that the employer has their best interest in mind or because they
believe that the government mandated such a default option and the government has their
best interest in mind—this would affect their decisions, whether to collect information and
whether to opt out. 52 The precise effects depend on the nature of the information that the
employer has. Here, we assume that the employer has information only about average
values. The alternative assumption is considered in Subsection 5 below.
If employees hold accurate uninformed beliefs, the employer has no informational
advantage and the default it sets conveys no new information. The employer should choose
the same default prescribed by our theory when there is no information conveyed by the
default (which, in the case of high information costs, is the one that maximizes expected
value). 53

This can be viewed as a formalization of the “endorsement effect” that is noted in the behavioral economics
literature as a reason why people stick with the default. See, e.g., Beshears et al., supra note 10, at Sec. X;
Jachimowicz et al., supra note 3, (listing the endorsement effect as one of three main reasons why defaults
are sticky); Craig R.M. McKenzie, Michael J. Liersch and Stacey R. Finkelstein, Recommendations Implicit
in Policy Defaults, 17 PSYCHOL. SCIE. 414, 418 (2006) (“[P]olicymakers’ choice of default leaks information
regarding their beliefs or attitudes about the available options, and the public is sensitive to this information.”).
The policymaker’s choice of default can also contain relevant information about what others are doing, about
the social norm, which can affect an individual’s payoffs.
53
If, instead, the employer is known to choose the default option that is best for a majority of employees,
rather than the one that maximizes the expected value to employees, the employees who remain uninformed
will opt out.
52
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By contrast, when employees have inaccurate uninformed beliefs, the employer’s choice
of default conveys information. Uninformed employees who recognize that the employer
has better information about average values will update their beliefs after observing the
employer’s default choice. In our example above, uninformed employees mistakenly
thought that the prevalence of Type 1 is 80%, when in fact it was 60%. With high
information costs, the policy prescription was to “succumb” to the misperception and
choose the default that maximizes perceived expected value, namely, Low default. This
prescription may change once employees draw inferences from the employer’s default
choice. The employer could then choose High default, which maximizes actual (not
perceived) expected value, and the employees, observing this default choice, would infer
that the likelihood of being Type 1 is lower than 80% and stick with the default. Here, the
presence of an endorsement effect contributes to the stickiness of the default. 54
The preceding analysis assumed that the employer has her employees’ best interests in
mind and that the employees accurately perceive their employer’s benevolence. But what
if the employer’s interests are not perfectly aligned with the employees’ interests? 55 Then
an employer might set a default that does not maximize her employees’ expected value. If
employees are aware of this conflict of interests, little harm is done; the employees would
simply rely on their own imperfect information about average values (and not use the
default option to update beliefs), as in our basic model. 56 The concern is that employees
would mistakenly attribute benevolence to a non-benevolent employer. This could render
the inefficient default sticky and prevent efficient uninformed opt-out.
We have thus far focused on the high-information-cost case, where parties do not acquire
information. When information costs are lower, the endorsement effect can also influence
the decision to acquire information. For example, uninformed employees who doubt the
accuracy of their information about average values may decide to acquire more information.
But if they get an informative signal from their employer, through the default choice, that
alleviates uncertainty about average values, they may no longer feel the need to invest in
information acquisition.
The informational content that default rules have depends on the perceived informational
advantage that a default-setter enjoys in the eyes of the decisionmaker. This endorsement
effect also depends crucially on the perceived alignment, or misalignment, of interests
between the default-setter and the decisionmaker. The greatest potential reduction in social
welfare arises when decisionmakers overestimate the informational advantage of the
default-setter or mistakenly believe that the default-setter is looking after their interests.
The importance of endorsement effects may vary across contexts and should not be
exaggerated. In many contexts, trust in the default-setter will not be high or, simply,
See, e.g., Beshears et al., supra note 10, at Sec. X; McKenzie et al., supra note 52.
See Ryan Bubb, Patrick Corrigan and Patrick L Warren, A Behavioral Contract Theory Perspective on
Retirement Savings, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1317 (2015); Ryan Bubb and Patrick L. Warren, An Equilibrium
Theory of Retirement Plan Design (work in progress).
56
If the interests of the employer and the employee are in conflict, then when the employer chooses one
default the employees may infer that the non-default option is better for them. Of course, anticipating such
inferences, the employer may choose the default strategically. Such anti-endorsement effects are even more
likely in the consumer context, where the interests of sellers and consumers are often in conflict.
54
55

25
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3582129

decisionmakers will prefer to rely on their own information. However, in some contexts
where the government is known to be setting the default, the endorsement effect could be
significant, especially if it is further bolstered by public education campaigns that advertise
the chosen default and explain its advantages. 57
C. Influencing Uninformed Beliefs
The recognition that, because of high information costs, at least some people will remain
uninformed emphasizes the importance of uninformed beliefs. Such beliefs affect the optout behavior of individuals that choose to remain uninformed, and distort the decision to
acquire information. Accordingly, policymakers should pay more attention to uninformed
beliefs and perhaps even seek to influence them.
How? We explained above that the legally prescribed default could at times shape
uninformed beliefs. Even more aggressively, policymakers could actively warn consumers
about the adverse consequences of choosing the non-default option. While we have our
doubts about the ability of lawmakers to successfully educate people about the myriad of
issues covered by default rules, it is possible that in select and particularly salient contexts
such interventions would be desirable.
At the same time, “educational” campaigns are attempted by other interested parties who
hope to influence—or manipulate—people’s uninformed beliefs so as to induce them to
opt out of the policymaker’s protective default. In the consumer context, firms work hard
to exert such influence. They highlight the benefits of their preferred opt-out option,
emphasizing some dimensions of its value to consumers, while magnifying the risks of
foregoing this “recommended” option. 58 Indeed, when a firm prefers a non-default option,

57
See, e.g., Kim Willsher, France Introduces Opt-Out Policy on Organ Donation, GUARDIAN (Jan. 2, 2017,
8:21 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/jan/02/france-organ-donation-law (describing an
official French campaign, which included a video advertisement, discouraging people from opting out of
organ donation).
58
See Willis, supra note 23, at 1172–73 (“Firms exacerbate judgment and decision biases intentionally
through framing devices. They advertise the benefits of the default, both to directly shape preferences and so
that consumers will consider the benefits of the default before considering any alternatives … They trumpet
the benefits and downplay the costs of the default. They explicitly tell consumers that the default is
‘recommended’ or ‘advised’.”); Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61,
82–3, 95, 102 (2014) (“Opting out of a default also might be made more or less attractive through messages
to the user … warn the user that changing the setting could cause problems”; “goes so far as to warn
consumers that choosing not to be tracked will ‘spoil your experience of the website’”; “financial information
defaults [are] designed to trigger loss aversion and the endowment effect … warns that opting out will cause
consumers to lose benefits they now have.”); Kevin Bankston, Facebook’s New Privacy Changes: The Good,
The Bad, and The Ugly, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Dec. 9, 2009),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/12/facebooks-new-privacy-changes-good-bad-and-ugly
(“Although
sold as a ‘privacy’ revamp, Facebook's new changes are obviously intended to get people to open up even
more of their Facebook data to the public. The privacy ‘transition tool’ that guides users through the
configuration will ‘recommend’ – preselect by default – the setting to share the content they post to
Facebook.”); Google Chrome, Privacy Settings (“allow websites to save and read cookie date
recommended.”).
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a contest between the policymaker and the firm over consumers’ perceptions may ensue.59
It is hard to imagine that lawmakers could win such tournaments; 60 their best chance is to
find novel ways to outlaw some of the firms’ manipulative campaigns. While a general
regulatory framework to disallow such manipulations does not presently exist, the law of
deception could be stretched to deal with the worst cases.
D. Forced Deliberation
Our theoretical model assumed that any default prompts people to engage in the mental
exertion of comparing its value to that of the opt-out option, if only in (uninformed)
expected-value terms. But the number of issues that people encounter and that are governed
by defaults is so vast that it casts doubt on this ideal of active evaluation and comparison.
Indeed, many people likely stick to many defaults without thinking; they just decline to
make an active decision. How could people know which issues are worth some deliberation?
How could policymakers help by selectively identifying important issues and encourage
deliberation, even uninformed deliberation, about these issues?
One such technique is enacting a “no-default regime.” In it, people cannot remain passive,
as the no-default requires active choice in order to complete the transaction. 61 For example,
an employee must select a retirement plan or else the employment relationship cannot begin;
or an applicant cannot apply for a driver’s license without first choosing whether to be an
organ donor. 62 Our analysis of uninformed opt-out makes it harder to justify such active
choice structures. Even if they induce people to deliberate and choose, they usually lead to
an uninformed opt-in, where people select what they perceive as the highest expected value
option. Lawmakers could have chosen this option as the default, saving some mechanical
costs of opt-in.
But active choice could be more subtly rationalized as a behaviorally-designed technique
that forces people to think and acquire information when such acquisition is worthwhile.
When forced to choose, people might be prompted to think harder and acquire more
As with advertising generally, one could ask if policymakers and firms are targeting consumers’
perceptions or trying to shape consumer preferences. See generally, e.g., Christina L. Brown & Aradhna
Krishna, The Skeptical Shopper: A Metacognitive Account for the Effects of Default Options on Choice, 31
J. CONSUMER RES. 529 (2004); Christopher A. Summers, Robert W. Smith, & Rebecca Walker Reczek, An
Audience of One: Behaviorally Targeted Ads as Implied Social Labels, 43 J. CONSUMER RES. 156 (2016);
Peter Wright, Marketplace Metacognition and Social Intelligence, 28 J. CONSUMER RES. 677 (2002).
60
See, e.g., Willis (2013), supra note 23, at 1184 (describing the impact of regulation that required consumers
to opt into overdraft protection and noting that “[n]ot all banks energetically pursued overdraft revenue after
the change in the law, but those that did have managed to achieve high opt-out rates . . . .” ).
61
Such active choice regimes have been offered in response to a critique that sticky defaults are paternalistic.
See, e.g., Luc Bovens, The Ethics of Nudge, in PREFERENCE CHANGE: APPROACHES FROM PHILOSOPHY,
ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY (Till Grüne-Yanoff and Sven Ove Hansson, eds., 2008). But see Craig N.
Smith, Daniel G. Goldstein, and Eric J. Johnson, Choice Without Awareness: Ethical and Policy Implications
of Defaults, 32 J. PUBLIC POL’Y & MARKETING 159, 163–64 (2013).
62
See generally NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES TEAM: 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2016); Beshears et al. (2018), supra note 10; Gabriel
D. Carroll et al., Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions, 124 Q. J. ECON. 1639 (2009).
59
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information towards an informed decision, which will lead to optimal sorting. It helps
people prioritize their limited attention and information acquisition resources. As long as
such strategy is used sparingly, the increased mechanical costs would be outweighed by
the superior ultimate outcomes. If used too often, it would lose its attention-alerting,
information-inducing, effect. 63
In addition, lawmakers could force people to notice and address an issue by enacting “stopand-think” defaults. These are surprising or unexpected defaults that send some signal to
people and force them to contemplate the issue. In the retirement savings context, a zerocontribution default may constitute such a stop-and-think default. It is clearly a suboptimal
contribution rate. It does not directly provide information about the optimal choice, but it
may encourage evaluation and information acquisition. 64
E. Default Rules with Different Information Costs
The basic theory presented in Section II.A made the simplifying assumption that the
distribution of information costs is independent of the chosen default. While this
assumption is a plausible benchmark, in some applications information costs may depend
on the default rule. Consider consumer contracts. The cost, to the consumer of becoming
informed may be quite high unless the seller is motivated to provide information. If the
seller’s incentive to provide information is stronger under one default and weaker under
the alternative default, then information costs vary with the chosen default. 65
In the overdraft protection example, a pro-bank default imposes higher information costs
than an anti-bank default. If the default is ‘overdraft protection’ and consumers are
expected to stick with the pro-bank default, then the bank would not provide any relevant
information and consumers would find it difficult to acquire information on their own –
perhaps because the uninformed consumers are not even aware of the overdraft protection
issue. In contrast, if the default is ‘no overdraft protection’ and consumers are expected to
stick with the anti-bank default, then the bank would have a strong incentive to provide
information to consumers about the benefits of the non-default, overdraft protection option.
The cost to consumers of acquiring at least some information – benefit information – is
lower under the anti-bank default. Other information – about the potential harm from
overdraft protection – would remain costly to acquire.
The policy implications of this observation are not obvious. It may seem that a rule that
induces lower information costs is the better rule. But there is a real risk that the low-cost
information will be biased, especially when it is provided by a seller who is trying to induce
Active choice can also be attractive if we are concerned about a false endorsement effect. Namely, if people
mistakenly trust an untrustworthy default setter and thus might stick to a harmful default, then an active
choice regime that strips power from the default setter can be helpful.
64
Compare Bernheim et al. (2015), supra note 20 (noting that extreme defaults can force active choice.)
Stop-and-think defaults are also related to penalty defaults. See Ayres and Gertner, supra note 19, and
Bebchuk and Shavell, supra note 19.
65
Compare Ayres and Gertner, supra note 19, and Bebchuk and Shavell, supra note 19.
63
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opt-out from a default that is less favorable to that seller. Also, as noted above, lower
information costs might actually reduce welfare.
F. Personalization
We have thus far assumed that the policymaker sets a single default rule for all relevant
parties. But this need not be the case. When default setters have better information –
individualized information – they can increase welfare by setting personalized defaults. 66
An employer will often have detailed personal information about the employees, including
age, income, number of dependents, education, and health. The employer can use this
information to offer, as a default, personalized contribution rates or retirement funds (with
personalized risk characteristics) to different employees. The optimal contribution and
investment option for a 25-year-old employee is different from that of the 65-year-old
employee. 67
The default setter could affirmatively elicit such personal information from people. For
example, an employer could ask (or require) the employees to complete a short survey and
based on the survey response set the personalized, default contribution rate. 68 Indeed, this
strategy can be viewed as a means of reducing information costs. The policymaker and the
individual join forces, combine their information, to arrive at the optimal default.
Personalized rules in general, and personalized default rules in particular, require large
amounts of information. At their purest form, they are derived from algorithmic analysis
of Big Data. Personalization is thus a solution to information problems that underlie a
heterogeneous society. It is a data-driven substitute for the solutions to the information
problem that are developed in our model, in which parties either act uninformed or spend
resources to acquire and analyze intuitive bits of information.
The possibility of personalization interacts with the preceding discussion about the
informational content of defaults (in Subsection 2 above). That discussion assumed that the
default setter knows only average values. What happens if the default setter knows
individual values? If a benevolent employer knows the type of each individual employee
and thus the optimal contribution rate for that employee, then the efficient outcome obtains
66
See also supra Section 0. (on The Informational Content of Default), where we discussed how the type of
information that the policymaker has – information on expected values of personalized information – affects
the inferences that individuals will draw from the chosen default option. Personalization also relates to our
Implementation discussion (where we consider the information that policymakers need to implement the
information-costs theory). See supra Part 0.
67
Some existing retirement defaults are age dependent. See Jill Cornfield, The Good and the Bad in This
Easy
One-Stop-Shopping
Retirement
Fund,
CNBC
(Oct.
16,
2018,
9:34
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/16/target-date-funds-are-super-simple-but-is-that-all-you-need-toknow.html. This is a minimal type of personalization. See, e.g., Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1147 (2014); Cass R. Sunstein,
Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 48–55 (2013).
68
The personalized default can be presented as a recommendation. For example, the employer could tell her
employee: “Based on the information that you provided (or based on the information that we have on you),
we think that a 7% contribution rate is optimal for you.”
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without any information acquisition by employees and without any opt out. Things change,
of course, if the employer is not benevolent, but rather looks after its own interests –
interests that conflict with those of the employees. If employees recognize the conflict of
interests, they will not draw inferences from the personalized default option. But if
employees mistakenly think that the employer is benevolent, they will not acquire
information and will stick to the default – to their detriment.

IV. Information Costs versus Mechanical Costs
The theory presented in Part II identified the phenomenon of uninformed opt out and began
to explore its implications. This phenomenon is the central implication of the distinction
between the two types of opt out costs—mechanical and informational. While much of the
literature considers the two as interchangeable components in the bin labeled ‘transactions
costs,’ their implications turn out to be different. High mechanical costs prevent opt out,
whereas high information costs can have the opposite effect and increase the incidence of
opt out. We saw in Part II that this difference has important implications for the design of
default rules.
In this Part we begin to examine more broadly the different regulatory implications of the
two types of transactions costs. The analysis examines two ways in which these costs could
be regulated. First, lawmakers may attempt to engineer the magnitude of these costs, so as
to achieve socially optimal outcomes. These efforts, we show, depend on the type of costs
involved. Second, firms dealing with consumers may also try to manipulate the costs their
counterparties incur when making opt out choices, but this time with the goal of steering
people towards the firms’ preferred choices. We examine what lawmakers can do to
counteract these efforts, and how these measures depend on the type of cost involved.
A. Cost-Engineering by Lawmakers
1. Increasing Mechanical Costs
Increasing mechanical opt-out costs could make opt out more difficult and the default
stickier. The motivation for such a policy is a reality where individuals too often agree to
opt-out of protective and socially desirable defaults. Making these defaults stickier via
mandates that increase mechanical costs (such as requiring more meticulous contract
formation routines) can thus be welfare enhancing. Increasing mechanical opt-out costs is
especially attractive when firms try to lure consumers to disclaim important protections. 69

See, e.g., Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir, supra note 4, at 8 (“Given the strong market pressures to deviate
from the default offer, we would need to require more than a simple opt-out to make the default sticky
enough . . . [t]hus, we propose that deviation from the offer would require heightened disclosures and
additional legal exposure for lenders in order to make the default sticky.”).
69
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Our analysis suggests that mechanical opt-out costs should be increased less often than
commonly intuited. We saw that when people have accurate beliefs, high mechanical optout costs reduce welfare, and thus increasing such costs and making defaults stickier makes
no sense; it hinders efficient informed and uninformed opt-out. Only when people have
inaccurate beliefs that would lead them to poorly-judged opt-outs should lawmakers create
mechanical obstacles. This, of course, is not surprising. Indeed, policymakers’ motivations
for such interventions sometimes rest on the notion that people opt out mistakenly. For
example, if people systematically underestimate the value of the default rule and agree to
opt out into inferior alternatives (being prompted by firms in these directions), building
road bumps against such hurried and harmful opt out would be good. Only people who
strongly prefer the alternative outcome—and thus presumably are less likely to be
mistaken—would be willing to incur the higher mechanical costs and to opt out. In this
context, sludge can be welfare-enhancing.
2. Lowering Information Costs
Our analysis is based on the premise that, more than mechanical opt-out costs, information
costs are often the major impediment to efficient opt-out. It might therefore be tempting to
think that reducing information costs is across the board desirable, and that any effort—
either by lawmakers or by counterparties—to deliberately increase information costs is
undesirable. Our analysis suggests, surprisingly, that when people have inaccurate beliefs
about which default is better for them, lower information costs might reduce welfare.
Specifically, when inaccurate beliefs result in an overestimation of the benefit from
information, individuals will tend to invest excessively in information acquisition. High
information costs limit the effects of this inefficient tendency.
This is not to say that lower information costs are generally, or even commonly, bad. Indeed,
it will generally be advisable to reduce information costs. Counterintuitively, even the
potential downside of low information costs noted above can be mitigated by lower
information costs. Low information costs can be harmful only when parties overestimate
the value of information. Such overestimation, and indeed any misperception, will be
mitigated when individuals are better informed. Thus, lower information costs reduce the
misperception that makes low information costs potentially harmful. This argument is not
circular. Information is not all-or-nothing; people can acquire less information or more
information. Accordingly, lower information costs can induce acquisition of the first batch
of information, and this information will limit any misperception that may otherwise have
led to inefficient acquisition of the second batch of information.
B. Fighting Cost-Engineering by Firms
1. Negative Opt-out Costs
Firms often manipulate mechanical opt out costs to get consumers to forgo a protective
default and opt-out into the firm’s preferred non-default option. The firms make it easy to
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opt out and mechanically painstaking to stick with the default. This is attractive to firms
that are hoping to profit by selling add-ons and other non-default features that consumers
would otherwise decline, or by avoiding socially valuable but costly (to the firm) consumer
protections. Rather than allowing the consumer to simply say “no” to the opt-out, firms
require a complicated ritual. Note that, in this second scenario, the mechanical costs of
opting out of the default are reduced, not increased. The increase is in the mechanical cost
of sticking to the default. The result is negative opt-out costs.
While policymaker’s motivations to inflate mechanical costs could be desirable (when used
in the right circumstances), the same cannot be said about firms’ motivations. As explained,
firms engineer mechanical costs to induce, rather than prevent, opt out. These are situations
in which consumers want to stick with the default but firms make it artificially hard to do
so. For example, consumers want to buy a standard product but firms prompt them to select
the (more profitable) premium version, and nudge them to do so again and again. In some
cases, firms give people only two options—“Yes” or “Not Now”—denying people the
preferred choice of “No” in the hope that eventually the not-now choosers will surrender
or inadvertently say “Yes.” These commercially motivated nudges, or rather “sludges” or
“dark patterns,” increase the mechanical costs of adopting the default. Contrary to our
model, where opt out was mechanically costlier than the default, sludges make opt out
effortless while the preservation of the default becomes unnecessarily cumbersome. In
essence, firms are automatically changing or “unclicking” the policymaker’s default. They
must elicit consumers’ consent to these reversals, and consumers—even uninformed—
might be unobliging. Even when uninformed, the consumers may regard these changes as
carrying negative expected value, resist them and, at some cost, keep the legal default. As
these mechanical costs increase, consumers’ resistance dissipates. 70
2. Fighting Costs with More Costs
Whether successful or not, the artificial mechanical costs imposed by such sludges are
reason enough for policymakers to intervene. They could do so by strengthening the
original default rule against unilateral changes by firms. This strategy results in a tug of
war between good nudges and bad sludges: To combat the “bad” mechanical costs of
sticking with the default, policymakers could mandate “good” mechanical costs for any opt
out. But while justified, the practical value of such policies is questionable. The most
typical tools policymakers use to increase mechanical opt-out costs are lengthy disclosures,
educational pre-requisites, segregated agreements, clause-by-clause signatures, and
periodically renewed agreements. 71 It is sometimes doubtful whether such hurdles succeed
See Luguri and Strahilevitz, supra note 12 (demonstrating, in experimental setting, the tendency of subjects
to accept the seller’s induced opt out option).
71
There are many examples where regulators deliberately increase opt-out costs. The GDPR requires more
explicit consent to information collection and some European lawmakers have required renewed consent for
every incidence of data collection. See infra Sec. III.B. See also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OVERDRAFT PROTECTION: OPT-IN REQUIREMENTS AND RELATED
MARKETING ISSUES (2010) (separate disclosure and segregated assent are now necessary to enroll in overdraft
protection); Loi 2016-41, supra note 11 (requiring the submission of form and proof of identity in order to
opt out of the default). There are also many examples of firms raising, or manufacturing, opt-out costs. See,
70
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in increasing opt-out costs in a manner sufficient to render the defaults stickier, especially
in the presence of a firm’s sludges. 72
3. Regulating Firm-Engineered Costs
Rather than fight costs with more costs, lawmakers can regulate the costs, or sludges, that
firms try to impose. The problem with this strategy is that it faces a line drawing challenge:
how to distinguish sludges from the multitude of other techniques used by firms to
influence consumers’ choices. All of advertising, in essence, is a campaign to affect
people’s choices, to ignite behavioral and cognitive mechanisms, and to deluge consumers
with invitations to opt in. Our theoretical framework provides a clue on how to design
pinpointed intervention. One difference between legal advertising and ought-to-be-illegal
sludges tracks the difference between mechanical and information costs. Much advertising
operates on the information dimension and does not create mechanical impediments. 73
Because the information it carries could be productive, its regulation is and should be
governed by false advertising and anti-deception laws. These laws have the dexterity to
prohibit practices that increase, rather than reduce, information costs. Sludges, by contrast,
are not informational; they operate within the dimension of mechanical costs. Because the
increased mechanical costs they inflict are never productive, they should be prohibited.
Indeed, regulating them could be a cornerstone of a new consumer anti-manipulation law.

e.g., Willis, supra note 23, at 1165, 1171 (2013) (“When the choice to opt out of a default is not made plain,
people may perceive a default as unchangeable”; “[f]irms actively work to increase the power of their defaults
using […] transaction barriers”; “firms with automatically renewing subscriptions that consumers can sign
up for in minutes online may require spending an hour on hold with costumer service to cancel”; “[f]irms
stymie consumers who might attempt to opt out, using fine print…”); Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or
No Options At All: The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1083, 1089 (1999)
(“[C]ompanies that offer opt-outs have an incentive to increase the transaction costs incurred by consumers
who opt out”; “provides subscribers with a lengthy, dull, and difficult-to-read statement of their rights and
requires subscribers wishing to opt out to communicate their intent in a separate writing.”); Nakashima supra
note 11 (an example where Google increased opt-out costs to make its privacy settings stickier); Sumit
Agarwal et al., Do Financial Counseling Mandates Improve Mortgage Choice and performance? Evidence
from a Legislative Experiment 32 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper No. 2009-07, 2009)
(“Those who were required to attend counseling … tended to not walk away from the original offer following
counseling and reapply … which would have required another counseling session”).
72
Compare Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032,
2093 (2012) (arguing that in some cases policymakers should use “impeding altering rules”, i.e. with high
opt-out costs, to reduce opt-out rates; Ayres notes that such “impeding altering rules” should be used when
people overestimate the benefit from opting out.)
73
While a large subset of advertising is informational, we recognize that another large subset of advertising
seeks to shape preferences or stir emotions. See Kyle Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, in
Mark Armstrong and Robert Porter (eds.), HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, Vol. 3, Ch. 28, pp.
1701-1844 (2007).
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V. Applications
As noted in the Introduction, default rules are increasingly being used across diverse policy
domains. Lawmakers are increasingly aware that default rules can be readily disclaimed,
and are thus working to design stickier defaults. High hopes for better social outcomes have
been hanging on this technique. In this Part, we consider, in some detail, several important
applications of regulation by default rules, and highlight the different ways in which our
information-costs theory informs these applications. Section A considers the regulation of
overdraft fees. Section B considers the protection of privacy in digital information. Section
C returns to the canonical example of retirement savings. And Section D discusses “green”
defaults.
A. Overdraft Protection
Debit card holders who do not have sufficient funds in their checking account are able to
complete debit transactions by borrowing from the bank. To do so, they have to enroll in
the bank’s overdraft protection plan. Until 2010, the law allowed banks to automatically
enroll their checking account customers; overdraft protection was the default. This policy
came under scrutiny, because card holders were charged high fees any time they borrowed
via overdraft withdrawal, and banks were collecting many billions of dollars, mostly from
low-income customers. 74
Recognizing that many people are either able to receive short term credit more cheaply
elsewhere, or have learned to regret the costly overdraft fees, in 2010, the Federal Reserve
reformed the law. Seeking to reduce the prevalence of overdraft transactions, the Fed
reversed the default. The previous overdraft protection default (auto-enrollment unless
consumers opt out) was replaced by a no-overdraft default (and express opt-in was required
for overdraft protection). 75 The new default was intended to be sticky, requiring more
mechanical effort to disclaim it. Separate disclosure and segregated assent were now
necessary to make enrollment effective. 76
The purpose of the new default was to prevent unsophisticated consumers from incurring
high overdraft fees, in the hope that only those who truly needed this exceptional measure
See, e.g., Peter Smith, Report: FDIC Data Shows that Banks Collected $11.45 Billion in Overdraft Fees
FOR
RESPONSIBLE
LENDING
(Aug.
7,
2018),
in
2017,
CENTER
https://www.responsiblelending.org/media/report-fdic-data-shows-banks-collected-1145-billion-overdraftfees-2017 (reporting on regarding only the ten largest banks in the country); Julie Chang, Americans Paid
$34 Billion in Overdraft Fees Last Year. Here’s How to Stop the Charges, FORBES (April 5, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/learnvest/2018/04/05/americans-paid-34-billion-in-overdraft-fees-last-yearheres-how-to-stop-the-charges/#7981b7703ce9; Jackie Wattles, Americans Paid $15 Billion in Overdraft
Fees Last Year CFPB Says, CNN (Aug. 4, 2017, 6:29 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/08/04/pf/overdraftfees-cfpb/index.html.
75
12 CFR § 205.17(c).
76
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OVERDRAFT PROTECTION:
OPT-IN REQUIREMENTS AND RELATED MARKETING ISSUES (2010).
74
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would knowingly and sparingly use it. This seemed like a perfect environment to use sticky
defaults, which protect vulnerable consumers from high overdraft fees, while allowing
those consumers who truly need a different regime to opt out.
Our analysis questions the ability of the new opt-in default to achieve its stated goal. As in
our model, it is useful to think of banking customers as consisting of two types: (1) a
majority who would overdraft rarely and thus gain a small benefit from overdraft protection;
and (2) a minority who would overdraft frequently and suffer a large loss from the multiple,
high overdraft fees. Indeed, evidence shows that the high overdraft fees, between $30-$35
for each overdraft, were incurred by a minority of consumers. As explained by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB): “In a given year, only 30% of consumers
overdraw their checking account. The 8% of consumers who overdraft more than 10 times
per year pay 74% of overdraft fees. These consumers are charged $380 in overdraft fees
on average annually.” 77
If consumers are uninformed about their type, how would they assess the expected value
of overdraft protection? A consumer with unbiased uninformed beliefs would likely prefer
no overdraft protection – the small benefit enjoyed by Type 1s is outweighed by the large
loss incurred by Type 2s (even if the chance of being Type 1 is larger). 78 If most consumers
were indeed uninformed, but unbiased, then the purpose of the 2010 default switch would
77
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (CFPB), A Closer Look: Overdraft and the Impact of OptingIn, January 19, 2017 (https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201701_cfpb_Overdraft-and-Impactof-Opting-In.pdf) (last visited on Nov. 25, 2019). The significant loss that Type 2 consumers incur is evident
when the high overdraft fees are compared to the small average charge that triggers this fee. See CFPB, CFPB
Finds Small Debit Purchases Lead to Expensive Overdraft Charges, July 31, 2014
(https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-finds-small-debit-purchases-lead-toexpensive-overdraft-charges/) (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (“The study found that the majority of debit card
overdraft fees are incurred on transactions of $24 or less.”)
78
There is some evidence that overdrafting, when the cost (fee or interest rate) is so high, is harmful to
consumers. See Paul Adams et al., Time to Act: A Field Experiment on Overdraft Alerts (Financial Conduct
Authority Occasional Paper 40, 2018) (finding that overdraft alerts reduce overdrafting by 21-25%,
suggesting that many consumers, when they are made aware of the overdraft decision, choose not to
overdraft). Moreover, the cost of “unarranged overdrafts” in the UK are smaller than overdraft fees in the
US, suggesting that the effect in the US would be larger than the 21-25% figures. Compare Rupert Jones,
(May
5,
2018),
Overdrafts:
Can
You
Cut
the
Cost
of
Yours?,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/money/2018/may/05/cut-cost-overdraft-uk-banks (describing UK overdraft
fees as around seven pounds) with Chang, supra note 74, (2018) (describing the average US overdraft fee as
around thirty dollars). See also OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, Personal Current Accounts in the UK: An OFT
Market Study, at 62 (2008) (“evidence from several recent market investigations suggests that some of these
incidental charges could have been avoided if consumers had been aware of their balance.”); Alasdair Smith
et al., Retail Banking Market Investigation, COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY, at 536 (2016) (“This
suggests that a significant proportion of customer detriment experience by overdraft users . . . may arise from
lack of awareness and engagement with their [personal current accounts].”); Andrea Caflisch et al., Sending
out an SMS: The impact of automatically enrolling consumers into overdraft alerts, (Financial Conduct
Authority, Occasional Paper 36, 2018) (finding that “[a]utomatic enrolment into unpaid item alerts reduces
charges by 21-24%” and that “[a]utomatic enrolment into unarranged overdraft alerts reduces charges by
25%”); Stefan Hunt et al., Message Received? The Impact of Annual Summaries, Text Alerts and Mobile
Apps on Consumer Banking Behavior (Financial Conduct Authority, Occasional Paper 10, 2015) (“signing
up to text alerts or mobile banking apps reduces the amount of unarranged overdraft charges incurred by 5%
to 8%, and signing up to both services has an additional effect, resulting in a total reduction of 24%.”).
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have been to save the costs of uninformed opt-out. Or, if these costs were high, to save
consumers from a harmful arrangement – overdraft protection – imposed by banks.
This account is challenged by evidence about the aftermath of the 2010 reform. With
unbiased beliefs, we would have expected minimal opt-out from the post-2010, nooverdraft-protection default. And yet many consumers opted out. In particular, 45% of the
frequent overdrafters opted out. 79 Why? It is possible that some of these consumers were
engaging in informed opted out, having learned from past experience that overdraft
protection is beneficial, despite the high fees. But it is also possible, indeed likely, that the
observed opt-out was largely uninformed and, moreover, based on false, uninformed
beliefs – that overdraft protection is a good deal.
These inaccurate beliefs were sustained by banks’ marketing efforts. The “overdraft
protection” label itself suggests a benefit, and the arrangement is promoted as a “free” perk
that allows the customer “to enjoy peace of mind”—namely, the option to make debit
purchases even with a zero balance. 80 Banks highlight the upside (avoiding declined
transactions), not the downside (high fees). And uninformed consumers, including those
who would ultimately incur multiple overdraft fees, opt out of the no-overdraft default,
often to their detriment. The new default is not as sticky as the Fed hoped.
We bring this example because a more general lesson can be learned from it. It is difficult
to change outcomes for consumers without addressing the uninformed opt-out
phenomenon, especially when it is fueled by inaccurate beliefs. Most attempts by
regulators to make a default sticky focus on the wrong method: making the mechanical
costs of opt-out higher. In the overdraft regulation, this increased cost amounted to an
additional disclosure-and-signature. These attempts fail because even with costlier
mechanics, opt-out remains easy; especially when the firm on the other side is motivated
to make it so.
Lawmakers could, instead, try to affect people’s uninformed beliefs, so that uninformed
consumers would learn to prefer the socially targeted outcome. But lawmakers could
educate people only on so many issues, and, besides, their attempts to influence uninformed
beliefs would need to overcome the industry’s own marketing campaigns. Lawmakers
could also try to lower people’s information costs to help them acquire information about
their individual type, or force firms to disclose such type-specific information. 81 Here, too,
we might worry that the corrective policy would disproportionately affect the more
educated consumers and might not prevent the irrational uninformed opt-out by others.
For frequent overdrafters, the group that policymakers were most concerned about, the opt-out rate is 45%.
(The overall opt-out rate is 16%, and for new accounts it is 22%.) See CFPB, CFPB Study of Overdraft
Programs, at 29-30 (June 2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_whitepaper_overdraftpractices.pdf (last visited on Nov. 25, 2019).
80
See Willis (2013), supra note 23, at 1191-92 (“In their communications with consumers, banks refer to
opting out of the policy default as ‘opting in’ to a bank's “overdraft service’. Thus, opting out of the default
is framed as gaining a service rather than losing an endowed reference position”; “In their marketing, banks
explicitly invoked loss aversion to encourage opting out with copy such as ‘Don't lose your ATM and Debit
Card Overdraft Protection’ and ‘STAY PROTECTED with [] ATM and Debit Card Overdraft Coverage.’”).
81
See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 45.
79
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B. Privacy
The basic default rule in many jurisdictions does not allow firms and digital platforms to
collect, use, and share the large quantities of personal information that many companies
rely on. People must consent to any opt-out from that default, and such consent is often
solicited through unread fine print. For example, under federal wiretap laws, Google may
not scan the text of its users’ email messages, unless the users agree. 82 And all users
unknowingly “agree.” Similarly, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
and California’s Consumer Privacy Act establish a default that prohibits collection of some
categories of personal information. And, again, most users opt out of this default without
an informed understanding of the implications of such opt out. How to design and police
such consent-based information collection has been the subject of much debate in privacy
law and of ongoing legal reform. While a possible regulatory approach would be to outlaw
the collection or sharing of some personal data, the far more common technique is to
redesign the default rules and the process of opt-out.
For long, the legal default of no-information-collection has been routinely subject to
uninformed opt-out. Firms interested in collecting personal information could easily guide
consumers to opt out.83 The mechanics of such opt-outs have been designed by firms to be
so easy and cheap that opt-out is achieved smoothly. This was uninformed opt-out at the
extreme. In our model, we regarded uninformed opt-out as a deliberate choice based on
imperfect information. In the privacy context, opt-out was uninformed in the sense that
people were not even aware that they are opting out. In this context, beliefs about the
relative (expected) payoffs of the high-privacy vs. low-privacy options became less
relevant. Alternatively, people believed that the payoff difference between high- vs. lowprivacy does not merit the attention to firms’ opting-out practices.
Then things began to change. Facebook’s lax data-sharing practices were revealed after the
Cambridge Analytica fiasco. This, together with a series of massive data security breaches,

25 U.S.C. 2511.
See Willis (2014), supra note 71 (“While a Don’t-Track-Me setting would require firms to spend
significant resources on maneuvering consumers out of the default, firms determined to do so could be
successful”); Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over Personal
Information, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 617 (2007) (“[P]rivacy policies are often presented in terms of
browsewrap. Users are deemed to have agreed to them simply by being on the website or by disclosing
information.”); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 460 (2006) (“[A]n increasing number
of courts have enforced “browsewrap” licenses, in which the user does not see the contract at all but in which
the license terms provide that using a Web site constitutes an agreement”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy
Inalienability and the Regulation of Spyware, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1269, 1274 (2005) (“[M]any dataprocessing institutions are likely to be good at obtaining consent on their terms regardless of whether the
default requires consumers to authorize or preclude information-sharing.”); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction:
Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1898–99 (2013)
(“[O]rganizations will have the sophistication and motivation to find ways to generate high opt-in rates … a
requirement of affirmative consent for most new uses of data will likely lead to more buttons to click and
more forms to sign, but not to more meaningful privacy protection.”).
82
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elevated the salience of data collection and its potential harms. 84 The enactment of the
European data regulations—the GDPR—further heightened the public’s awareness. 85
People’s beliefs have shifted to some degree, with more people noticing that a choice is
being made, forming more deliberate beliefs about the default and non-default options, and
perhaps increasingly believing that the no-information-collection regime is superior. By
and large, these are is still uninformed beliefs, because people need more information to
know how they are personally impacted.
Recent legal reforms have begun to address the process of opt-out. Lawmakers have taken
actions to increase mechanical opt-out costs, and also to reduce information costs.
Mechanical costs were increased by requiring more explicit consent to information
collection, in the hope of making it more difficult for firms to induce opt-out. 86 In some

84
See, e.g., Julie Beck, People are Changing the Way They Use Social Media, THE ATLANTIC (June 7, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/06/did-cambridge-analytica-actually-changefacebook-users-behavior/562154/ (suggesting that breaches like Cambridge Analytica led users to share less
detailed information online); Andrew Perrin, Americans are Changing Their Relationship with Facebook,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/05/americans-arechanging-their-relationship-with-facebook/ (finding, in a survey months after the Cambridge Analytica story
broke, that 54% of Facebook users had adjusted their privacy settings in the past year); see also Kim Hart &
Ina Fried, Exclusive Poll: Facebook Favorability Plunges, AXIOS (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://www.axios.com/exclusive-poll-facebook-favorability-plunges-1522057235-b1fa31db-e646-4413a273-95d3387da4f2.html (showing that Facebook’s favorability had fallen 28 points in the wake of the
revelations regarding Cambridge Analytica).
85
See, e.g., European Commission Press Release IP/19/2956, Data Protection Regulation One Year on: 73%
of Europeans Have Heard of At Least One of Their Rights (June 13, 2019).
86
See GDPR, recital 32 (“Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given,
specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's agreement to the processing of personal
data relating to him or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral
statement … Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent ... When the
processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them.”). GDPR creates a range of optout costs depending on the type of information collected. There are two main types of consent (which can be
further varied by each EU member state): “explicit” consent (as defined in article 9), which applies to
sensitive information (health, sexual orientation, politics, etc.); and “unambiguous” (implied) consent (as
defined in articles 4 and 7), which applies to all other information. Explicit consent imposes higher opt-out
costs, because the user must be given notice of the purpose and type of information collected and the user
must explicitly assent to them. Unambiguous consent imposes lower opt-out costs (e.g., using a site multiple
times after agreeing to cookies clears the hurdle, or agreeing by submitting an email address, etc.).
STREAMS.IO
(Oct.
11,
2017),
See Explicit
vs.
Unambiguous
Consent,
DATA
https://www.datastreams.io/explicit-vs-unambiguous-consent-whats-the-difference/.
[On January 21st, 2019, by force of the GDPR, the French National Data Protection Commission imposed a
fine of 50 million euros on Google LLC, due to several breaches, one of them being the unlawful acquisition
of consent to the processing of personal data for personalized advertisement. See NATIONAL DATA
PROTECTION COMMISSION, The CNIL’s Restricted Committee Imposes a Financial Penalty of 50 Million
Euros Against Google LLC (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.cnil.fr/en/cnils-restricted-committee-imposesfinancial-penalty-50-million-euros-against-google-llc.]
The new California Consumer Privacy Act, recognizing the reality of wholesale opt-out by Privacy Policy,
makes it easier for consumers to opt back into the no collection default by requiring that firms add a “Do Not
Sell My Personal Information” link to their websites. See OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GENERAL, CAL. DEP’T OF
JUST., CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT (CCPA) FACT SHEET (2019).
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cases, lawmakers have required renewed consent for every incidence of data collection. 87
Information costs were reduced through mandates requiring explanations in simple
language and easy-to-use privacy tools, so that people interested in making an informed
choice could do so. 88
Our analysis sheds light on these reforms. Again, it is useful to think of users as consisting
of two types. High-harm types are more sensitive to data privacy concerns than low-harm
types. Some consumers acquire information and, if they discover that they are high-harm
types, make informed decisions to preserve the legal default (which is often not easy, when
opt-out costs are negative and a choice to maintain the default entails deliberate and careful
rejection of repeat invitations to opt out). But how do the uninformed consumers behave?
It is possible that the public anger towards some data platforms persuaded a fraction of the
consumer body to change its uninformed behavior and to stick with, rather than opt out of,
the privacy-protective default. This could be interpreted as a shift towards more accurate
uninformed beliefs (or, rather, to less accurate uninformed beliefs, if the privacy costs are
relatively small). Many, however, continue to take the path of least resistance charted by
firms and opt out of the privacy-protective default. They incur slightly higher mechanical
costs, which create some “annoyance,” 89 but not enough annoyance to make the default
sticky. (Indeed, sticking with the default, when firms repeatedly invite opt-out can be more
annoying.)
Without a better empirical sense which default maximizes expected welfare, it is hard to
interpret which outcome is desirable. Uninformed opt-out may be privately optimal if
private harms from data collection are small and private benefits large. If that is the case,
those who stick with the default while uninformed are over-reacting to the public outcry.
But it is also possible that uninformed opt-out is welfare-reducing, and users agreeing to it
are misjudging the harms that surrendering their data would ultimately cause. 90
Unlike the overdraft regulation, which only required additional mechanical rituals to opt
out, privacy laws are trying to reduce uninformed opt-out by also targeting information
See, e.g., Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, Délibération no. 2019-03 (July 4, 2019)
(providing the French government’s guidelines for compliance with the GDPR and requiring renewed
consent after 13 months).
88
See GDPR, ch. II, art. 7, § 2 (“ . . . the request for consent shall be presented in a manner which is clearly
distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain
language.”). Following the enactment of the GDPR, the California State Legislature passed a similar bill to
enhance privacy protection, that includes mandates aimed at facilitating consumers’ understanding of
contractual terms regarding the collection and usage of information by firms. See California Consumer
Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (effective January 1, 2020).
89
See, e.g., Jack Schofield, What Should I Do About All The GDPR Pop-ups on Websites?, GUARDIAN (July
5, 2018, 11:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/askjack/2018/jul/05/what-should-i-do-aboutall-the-gdpr-pop-ups-on-websites.
90
The Stigler Center Report advocates for “consumertarian defaults” and high opt-out costs or opt-out
procedures that would require firms to convince, rather than trick, consumers to opt out. It is hard to believe
that firms will provide individualized, type information. Rather firms will try to influence uninformed beliefs.
If accurate uninformed beliefs support the consumertarian default, there is a real concern that firms will
promote inaccurate beliefs and induce inefficient, uninformed opt-out. If accurate uninformed beliefs do not
support the consumertarian default, then is the default really consumertarian?
87
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costs. If lawmakers succeed in reducing information costs, some uninformed action will be
replaced with informed choice. Ideally, people will self-select according to their type. It is
possible, however, as our model showed, that some of the uninformed resistance to data
sharing would subside and as a result there will be more opt-out.
C. Retirement Savings
The retirement savings defaults have featured as a canonical example for the power of
default rules to change behavior. A large empirical literature demonstrated that the autoenrollment defaults stick, 91 and this evidence inspired a search for theoretical explanations.
The behavioral economics literature viewed the evidence as consistent with
decisionmakers’ cognitive limitations. Based on that evidence and the behavioral
interpretation, commentators called for using default rules as a solution to many social
problems. 92
Our information-costs theory sheds new light on emerging evidence of opt-out behavior in
the retirement savings context. We offer a different framework to understand the
empirically observed stickiness. If the mechanical costs of opt-out are low, what explains
this stickiness? Why do we not observe uninformed opt-out from some defaults? This area
of contracting differs from many others by the role that the informed party—here, the
employer—plays. First, unlike many other contexts, the employer does not have a strong
interest in the content of the default and does not actively propel employees towards, or
away from, a specific arrangement. The firm-induced uninformed opt-out that takes place
in the overdraft and privacy contexts does not happen here. Second, retirement contribution
defaults may be sticky if employees attribute an informational signal to the default
presented to them—an endorsement effect. Many employees trust that their employer is
looking after their best interests and adjust their uninformed beliefs based on the default
that the employer chooses. While much of the literature regards this endorsement effect as
a socially desirable information inference, recent work notes the potential conflicts of
interests between employers and employees and suggests that the employer’s default could
bias employees’ uninformed beliefs and lead to inefficient decisions to stick with the
default. 93
Retirement savings defaults are somewhat sticky. 94 But even in this archetypal example of
sticky defaults, there is mounting evidence of wholesale opt out—even in this context some
defaults are quite slippery, especially over time. The traditional zero contribution rate (or
no enrollment) default may have stuck for the short term, but over time it was relatively
slippery – approximately 60% of employees opted out. 95 A similar percentage of
See, e.g., Beshears et al., supra note 10.
See sources cited supra notes 3-4.
93
See Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, An Equilibrium Theory of Retirement Plan Design, AM. ECON. J.:
ECON. POL’Y (forthcoming).
94
Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and
Savings Behavior, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1149 (2001).
95
See, e.g., William E. Nessmith, Stephen P. Utkus, & Jean A. Young, Measuring the Effectiveness of
Automatic Enrollment, 31 Vanguard Center for Retirement Research, 1, 10 (2007) (showing that voluntary
91
92
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employees opted out, over time, from the common 3% contribution rate default. 96 Perhaps
these were stop-and-think defaults encouraging some employees to acquire information.
For most employees, however, the opt out was likely uninformed (or largely uninformed).
Employees just had a sense that 0% or 3% is too low and opted for something higher.
But even if retirement-savings defaults are not as sticky as commonly believed, they have
still proven more resilient to uninformed opt-out, as compared to many other defaults. This
relative stickiness has inspired support for default rules as a consumer protection technique
in many other contexts. Such uncritical borrowing from the retirement-savings contexts is
perilous. In other contexts, the informational structure is significantly different. It is not
clear whether the lawmaker’s default contains the same informational content as the
employer’s default; lawmakers may be looking out for other groups and can be motivated
by political pressure and popular sentiment. 97 The endorsement effect may thus be weaker.
And in consumer markets, even if the lawmaker’s default is pro-consumer and should
benefit from an endorsement effect, sellers try hard to shift uninformed beliefs away from
the default and towards the seller’s preferred option. 98 Overall, the stickiness observed in
the retirement savings context is probably not representative.
D. “Green” Defaults
Default rules have been extensively used to encourage environmentally-friendly (“green”)
outcomes, such as purchasing electricity from clean, renewable sources, using energyefficient light bulbs, enduring a lower temperature on the office thermostat, and utilizing
double-sided printing. 99 While there are some success stories, a recent meta-analysis
enrollment increased from 32% to 59% over the course of the first three years of employment); Vanguard,
How America Saves (2019), p. 35 (the participation rate in voluntary enrollment, i.e., zero default, plans was
60%).
96
See, e.g., Nessmith et al, id., p. 11 (“after 30 months, 57% of the employees hired under automatic
enrollment [] have a rate higher than the default.” [about half of the automatic enrollment plans featured
automatic annual increases in the contribution rate; we are assuming that the “rate higher than the default”
finding means higher than the annually-adjusted default]). On the predominant contribution rate default of
3%, see id. at 6 (“The median contribution rate in automatic enrollment designs is 2.9%.”); Vanguard, id., at
40 (noting the predominant 3% default).
97
This is not to say that the lawmaker’s default can never have an informational effect. In the organ donations
context, it has been argued that the lawmaker’s default contains information about social norms. See, e.g.,
Shai Davidai, Thomas Gilovich, & Lee D. Ross, The Meaning of Default Options for Potential Organ Donors,
109 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (PNAS) 15201 (2012); see generally
Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law Moral Attitudes, and Behavioral Change, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 241 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014).
98
See Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, & Eldar Shafir, The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation,
25 NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REG. 41 (2009) (contrasting the employment and consumer context and arguing
that market forces make defaults slippery, without emphasizing the information effects).
99
See Zachary Brown et al., Testing the Effect of Defaults on the Thermostat Settings of OECD Employees,
39 ENERGY ECON. 128 (2013) (green thermostat); Isaac Dinner et al., Partitioning Default Effects: Why
People Choose Not to Choose, 17 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 332 (2011) (green lightbulbs); Felix Ebeling
& Sebastian Lotz, Domestic Uptake of Green Energy Promoted by Opt-Out Tariffs, 5 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 868 (2015) (green electricity); Johan Egebark & Mathias Ekström, Can Indifference Make the World
Greener?, 76 J. ENVTL. ECON. AND MGMT. 1 (2016) (green printing); Simon Hedlin & Cass R. Sunstein,
Does Active Choosing Promote Green Energy Use? Experimental Evidence, 43 ECOLOGY LQ 107 (2016)
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suggests a relatively small effect of defaults in the environmental context. 100 The
information-cost theory sheds light on these green defaults and helps predict when default
rules are more or less likely to affect outcomes.
Two studies are particularly instructive, and particularly susceptible to an informationcosts analysis. In a field experiment conducted by Araña and León (2013), subjects were
attendees of different academic conference and conventions across disciplines. 101 These
subjects were asked whether they would like to pay to offset the carbon emissions caused
by their travel to the conference. For some subjects the default option was to pay the carbon
offset and they had to actively decline to avoid payment. Other subjects faced the opposite
default, and had to actively choose the carbon offset payment. The effect of the default
choice was significant, at least when the carbon offset payment was relatively modest. For
example, when the carbon offset payment was 10 EUR, a switch to the green default
increased the participation rate (in the carbon offset program) from 62% to 81%. 102 The
results of this study are most informative, when compared to a very similar study by
Löfgren et al. (2012). The only difference was that, in Löfgren et al. (2012), subjects were
attendees of a single academic conference – on environmental economics. 103 In this study,
the default choice had no statistically significant effect. (The participation rate, for a 10
EUR carbon offset payment, was approximately 50%.)
The information-cost theory can help reconcile these studies. The theory tells us that an
informed party is less likely to be affected by the chosen default. If I know the
environmental costs of travel to the conference, then I would participate in the carbon offset
program, or not, depending on how much I care about the environment. The default would
not have a large effect. In contrast, if I am uninformed and thus unsure about the
environmental cost of travel, the default would have a stronger effect: I might glean
information from the default (an endorsement effect). Or, I might simply stick to the default,
because my weaker “average” preferences – for or against the carbon offset – are
insufficient to overcome the opt-out cost. If the goal is to promote an environmental goal
using a green default, the strategy is more likely to succeed when the decision makers are
uninformed.

(green electricity); Daniel Pichert & Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos, Green Defaults: Information
Presentation and Pro-Environmental Behaviour, 28 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 63 (2008) (green electricity).
100
Jon M. Jachimowicz et al., When and Why Defaults Influence Decisions: A Meta-Analysis of Default
Effects, 3 BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC POLICY 159, 162 (2019).
101
Jorge E. Araña & Carmelo J. León, Can Defaults Save the Climate? Evidence From a Field Experiment
on Carbon Offsetting Programs, 54 ENVTL. AND RESOURCE ECON. 613, 616–17 (2013).
102
Id., at 619.
103
Åsa Löfgren et al., Are Experienced People Affected by a Pre-Set Default Option—Results From a Field
Experiment, 63 J. ENVTL. ECON. AND MGMT. 66, 66 (2012).

42
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3582129

VI. Conclusion
This Article develops a new information-costs theory of default rules, and uses this theory
to help policymakers choose the best default option, but also to evaluate the limits of
regulation-by-default. The prescriptions derived from the information-costs theory rely on
various assumptions, and we cannot end without discussing the realism of these
assumptions and the applicability of the theory.
The theory assumes that people have less than full information about the value of the
default rules, and thus behave on the basis of their uninformed expectations regarding the
average values of the default and non-default options. This raises two related questions.
First, is it realistic to assume that people make decisions based on average values? And
second, do lawmakers have the information necessary to effectively use our informationcosts theory?
We recognize that people often lack information about average payoffs under each
potential default. Indeed, the assumption that people know average values should not be
taken literally. All we need to assume is that, before any information is acquired, people
form some estimate about the net benefit – the average value – of the default vs. non-default
options. This estimate need not be accurate and, indeed, our analysis allows for inaccurate
beliefs.
A separate assumption underlying our analysis applies to information that lawmakers have.
In order to set the optimal default, lawmakers need various types of information, primarily
regarding the preferences of groups of people, but also regarding the information costs that
people have. Consider first the case where information costs are clearly low enough that
most people will choose to become informed. This is the scenario assumed by most
traditional accounts of default choice. In this scenario, lawmakers have to set the default
that most people would prefer – a majoritarian default. For this, they have to know which
option is favored by a majority of people.
By contrast, in the case where information costs are sufficiently high, lawmakers have to
set a default with the highest expected value. For this, they need information about
expected values (the same information that uninformed people have). This becomes more
complicated when individuals hold inaccurate uninformed beliefs, because lawmakers now
have to identify the default with the highest perceived expected value, namely, they need
to have some sense of the direction and magnitude of people’s misperceptions. Things
become significantly easier, if people derive information from the content of the default.
Then, lawmakers face a lesser informational burden, as they may choose the option with
the highest expected value, knowing that many people will use the chosen default to correct
their misperception.
The hard case, in terms of informational demands on the policymaker, is the case where
information costs are intermediate. Here, information will be acquired under one default
rule, but not another; or by some individuals, but not others. To assess whether people will
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acquire information given a specific default rule, the policymaker needs to know the value
of information, 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 or 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ in our example. To calculate the value of information, the
policymaker needs the same information that an uninformed individual has. (Recall, the
uninformed individual calculates the value of information and thus decides whether to
become informed.) And, when individuals hold inaccurate uninformed beliefs, the
policymaker needs to know the perceived value of information. The policymaker also
needs to know the distribution of information costs in the population. Or, at least, she needs
to know for how many people the cost of becoming informed is smaller than the value of
information and for how many the cost of becoming informed is larger than the value of
information.
Finally, if people draw inferences from the content of the chosen default (endorsement
effect), then policymakers need to know whether or not they are trusted. If people trust the
policymaker, then the policymaker can use the choice of default to inform people. And, as
we have seen, this allows the policymaker to achieve higher welfare levels, correcting
misperceptions rather than accommodating them.
In some cases, lawmakers will have the kind of information that our model requires them
to know in order to design optimal defaults. In other cases, they won’t. More generally,
there are valuable insights from the model that could inform regulatory design without the
need to rely on complex information. Our key insight—that uninformed opt-out makes
defaults less sticky than otherwise assumed—should help lawmakers avoid regulatory
failures. We showed that lawmakers rush to endorse regulation-by-default, in the hope that
good outcomes would ensue when these new defaults stick. The most important
information that lawmakers need to have is that these hopes are over-optimistic. We
therefore urge lawmakers to exercise more caution before relying on the stickiness of
defaults.
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Appendix
[Note to the Editor: This Appendix can be published in print with the main
text or as an online Appendix. Or it can be removed altogether. We leave it
up to you.]
The Appendix generalizes and extends the numerical example of Part II, using a formal
model. In Section A, we present our framework of analysis. In Section B, we analyze
outcomes and welfare with Low default. In Section C, we analyze outcomes and welfare
with High default. In Section D, we compare the two defaults and provide guidance to
policymakers about optimal default design. We initially assume that uninformed
individuals hold accurate beliefs about the relevant parameters and can accurately assess
the expected values of the different options. The implications of inaccurate beliefs are
explored in Section E.
A. Framework
Consider a binary choice between two options that we will call Low and High. We
normalize the net benefit from Low to zero. The benefits and costs generated by High differ
across individuals. Specifically, a share 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0,1] of individuals enjoy a net benefit 𝐵𝐵 > 0,
whereas the remaining 1 − 𝛼𝛼 incur a net cost of 𝐶𝐶 > 0. We call individuals who prefer
Low type 1, and call individuals who prefer High type 2.

We consider two possible default rules: Low default (or L default), which corresponds to
Low, and High default (or H default), which corresponds to High. Parties can opt out of
either default at a cost k. (We will analyze choices and welfare for different opt-out cost
levels, k. A more general model would assume that k is distributed across contracting pairs
according to 𝐹𝐹(∙) and derive expected welfare levels based on this distribution. Since our
focus is on information costs and not on opt-out costs, this more general framework is not
needed for our purposes.)
Initially, individuals do not know whether they are type 1 or type 2. Individuals can invest
x and learn their type. The investment x varies among individuals, according to the
cumulative distribution function 𝐺𝐺(∙) and the density function 𝑔𝑔(∙). (The distribution of
information costs, x, is the same for both types.) There is a threshold 𝑥𝑥� (derived below),
such that individuals with 𝑥𝑥 < 𝑥𝑥� invest and learn their type, while individuals with 𝑥𝑥 ≥ 𝑥𝑥�
remain uninformed. (This framework covers scenarios where some individuals initially
know their type; in such scenarios the probability function would have a mass point at x =
0.) 104 We assume that uninformed individuals hold accurate beliefs about the share 𝛼𝛼 and
Of the 𝐺𝐺(𝑥𝑥�) individuals who learn their type, 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼(𝑥𝑥�) learn that they are type 2 and (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐺𝐺(𝑥𝑥�) learn that
they are type 1. A share 1 − 𝐺𝐺(𝑥𝑥�) of individuals remain uninformed about their type and believe that with a
probability 𝛼𝛼 they are type 2 and with probability 1 − 𝛼𝛼 they are type 1. This group of uninformed
individuals can be further divided into the 𝛼𝛼�1 − 𝐺𝐺(𝑥𝑥�)� type 1s and the (1 − 𝛼𝛼)�1 − 𝐺𝐺(𝑥𝑥�)� type 2s. To
summarize: There are four groups of individuals – Group 1, with a measure of 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼(𝑥𝑥�) who know that they
are type 2; Group 2 with measure (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐺𝐺(𝑥𝑥�) who know that they are type 1; Group 3 with measure
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about the parameters B and C. The implications of inaccurate beliefs are explored in
Section E below.
The first question is whether an individual decides to become informed. Depending on this
decision, we then have either informed or uninformed opt-out. Informed opt-out occurs,
when (i) individuals who invest x and learn that they are type 2 decide to opt out of Low
default (when 𝑘𝑘 < 𝐵𝐵); or (ii) individuals who invest x and learn that they are type 1 decide
to opt out of High default (when 𝑘𝑘 < 𝐶𝐶). Uninformed opt-out occurs, when (i) the expected
value of High is larger, i.e., 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 > 0, and uninformed individuals decide to
opt-out of Low default (when 𝑘𝑘 < 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶); or (ii) the expected value of Low is
higher, i.e., 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 < 0, and uninformed individuals decide to opt-out of High
default (when 𝑘𝑘 < (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼). In our analysis, we assume, without loss of generality,
that 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 ≥ 0. 105
B. Low Default

We study the two decisions faced by an individual: whether to become informed and
whether to opt out. Consider an individual with (𝑘𝑘, 𝑥𝑥). We map the information acquisition
and opt-out decisions for different levels of opt-out costs, k, but then focus on the low optout cost scenario.
High opt-out costs. When 𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝐵𝐵, the individual will not become informed, regardless of x.
In this range, the mechanical opt-out costs prevent even informed opt-out, and thus there
is no point in becoming informed. (And if there is no informed opt-out, there will be no
uninformed opt-out: 𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝐵𝐵 implies 𝑘𝑘 > 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶.) To summarize: When 𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝐵𝐵,
the opt-out rate is zero. In terms of welfare, for any 𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝐵𝐵, 𝑊𝑊 = 0.

Intermediate opt-out costs. When 𝑘𝑘 ∈ (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶, 𝐵𝐵), the mechanical opt-out costs
are low enough to permit informed opt-out, but not uninformed opt-out. Specifically, an
informed individual who learns that she is type 2 will opt out from Low default. If the
individual becomes informed, her expected payoff is: 𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 0 − 𝑥𝑥 =
𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) − 𝑥𝑥. If the individual remains uninformed, she will stick with Low default and
earn a payoff of zero. Therefore, individuals will become informed iff 𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) − 𝑥𝑥 > 0,
or 𝑥𝑥 < 𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘). To summarize, when 𝑘𝑘 ∈ (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶, 𝐵𝐵), a share 𝐺𝐺�𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘)� of
individuals will become informed and opt out with probability 𝛼𝛼 ; and a share 1 −
𝐺𝐺�𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘)� will remain uninformed and stick with the Low default. For a given k, the
opt-out rate is: 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼�𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘)�. In terms of welfare, for any 𝑘𝑘 ∈ (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶, 𝐵𝐵), 𝑊𝑊 =
𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵−𝑘𝑘)

∫0

(𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) − 𝑥𝑥)𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.

𝛼𝛼�1 − 𝐺𝐺(𝑥𝑥�)� who are type 2 but are uninformed about their type; and Group 4 with measure
(1 − 𝛼𝛼)�1 − 𝐺𝐺(𝑥𝑥�)� who are type 1 but are uninformed about their type.
105
The case where 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 < 0 , is captured by normalizing the High payoffs to be zero and
redefining 𝐶𝐶̃ = 𝐵𝐵 as the cost born by a share 𝛼𝛼 under Low, and 𝐵𝐵� = 𝐶𝐶 as the benefit enjoyed by a share 1-𝛼𝛼
under Low. The expected payoff in Low would then be: (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐵𝐵� − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶̃ ≥ 0. We can further redefine: 𝛼𝛼� =
1 − 𝛼𝛼, and get 𝛼𝛼�𝐵𝐵� − (1 − 𝛼𝛼�)𝐶𝐶̃ ≥ 0.
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Low opt-out costs. When 𝑘𝑘 < 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 , the mechanical opt-out costs are low
enough to permit both informed and uninformed opt-out. As with intermediate opt-out
costs, an informed individual who learns that she is type 2 will opt out from Low default.
If the individual becomes informed, her expected payoff is: 𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) − 𝑥𝑥. If the individual
remains uninformed, then she will opt-out from Low default and earn an expected payoff
of 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘. Therefore, individuals will become informed iff 𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) − 𝑥𝑥 >
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘, or 𝑥𝑥 < (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘). To summarize, when 𝑘𝑘 < 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶,
a share 𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)� will become informed and opt out with probability 𝛼𝛼; and a
share 1 − 𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)� will remain uninformed and opt out. For a given k, the optout rate is: 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)� + 1 − 𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)�. In terms of welfare, for any
𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶:
𝑊𝑊 =

(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶+𝑘𝑘)

(𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) − 𝑥𝑥)𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

�
0

+ �1 − 𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)�� (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘)

Special Case: Perfect Information. We note that the perfect information case, where all
individuals know their type without any need to invest in information acquisition, is a
special case that is embedded in the preceding analysis. Specifically, with perfect
information, we have 𝐺𝐺(0) = 1. When opt-out costs are either intermediate or low, this
implies an opt-out rate of 𝛼𝛼, and a welfare level of 𝑊𝑊 = 𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘). When opt-out costs are
high, the opt-out rate is zero and welfare is zero, even with perfect information.
These results are summarized in the following lemma.

Lemma 1 (Low Default):
(a) For any 𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝐵𝐵: The opt-out rate is zero and welfare is zero, with both perfect and
imperfect information.
(b) For any 𝑘𝑘 ∈ (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶, 𝐵𝐵): With perfect information, the opt-out rate is 𝛼𝛼
and welfare is 𝑊𝑊 = 𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) ; with imperfect information the opt-out rate is
𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵−𝑘𝑘)
(𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) − 𝑥𝑥)𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼�𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘)� < 𝛼𝛼 and welfare is 𝑊𝑊 = ∫0
(c) For any 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶: With perfect information, the opt-out rate is 𝛼𝛼 and
welfare is 𝑊𝑊 = 𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) ; with imperfect information the opt-out rate is
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)� + 1 − 𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)� > 𝛼𝛼 and welfare is
𝑊𝑊 =

(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶+𝑘𝑘)

�
0

(𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) − 𝑥𝑥)𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

+ �1 − 𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)�� (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘)
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The role of information costs. Ours is an information-costs theory. We thus focus on the
role that information costs play in the analysis, specifically how the magnitude of
information costs affects opt-out rates and welfare. We begin with the intermediate and
high opt-out costs scenarios. In these scenarios (where 𝐹𝐹(𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶) = 0), any optout will be informed. Therefore, a reduction in information costs, specifically when 𝐺𝐺(𝑥𝑥)
is higher for all x (notion of first-order stochastic dominance), increases the opt-out rate
and also increases welfare. This scenario captures the intuitive belief that high information
costs create sticky defaults. And if we think of unsophisticated individuals as having high
information costs, then we get the standard result that unsophisticated individuals always
stick with the default, whereas sophisticated individuals opt-out when the default is not
optimal for them.
The more interesting scenario is the low opt-out costs scenario. In this scenario (where
𝐹𝐹(𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶) = 1), we get both informed and uninformed opt-out. Specifically,
individuals with high information costs will remain uninformed and opt out; and
individuals with low information costs will opt-out only if they learn that the default is not
optimal for them. A reduction in information costs, specifically when 𝐺𝐺(𝑥𝑥) is higher for
all x (notion of first-order stochastic dominance), reduces the opt-out rate and increases
welfare. We get the counterintuitive result that lower information costs increase stickiness.
When information costs are high, few individuals become informed and, because opt-out
costs are low (and 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 > 0) all the uninformed individuals opt out. When
information costs are low, many individuals become informed and only a share 𝛼𝛼 of them
opt out.
Formally, for any 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶, the opt-out rate is: 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)� + 1 −
𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)� = 1 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)� . With lower information costs
(i.e., when 𝐺𝐺(𝑥𝑥) is higher for all x [notion of first-order stochastic dominance]), the optout rate is lower and thus the default is more sticky. And, of course, lower information
costs increase social welfare. Therefore, sticky defaults are associated with higher welfare.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (The Role of Information Costs):
(a) When 𝑭𝑭(𝜶𝜶𝜶𝜶 − (𝟏𝟏 − 𝜶𝜶)𝑪𝑪) = 𝟎𝟎, lower information costs reduce stickiness and
increase welfare.
(b) When 𝑭𝑭(𝜶𝜶𝜶𝜶 − (𝟏𝟏 − 𝜶𝜶)𝑪𝑪) = 𝟏𝟏 , lower information costs increase both
stickiness and welfare.
C. High Default
With High default, there are only two possible ranges of opt-out costs. When 𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝐶𝐶, there
will be no informed opt-out, and thus no one will acquire information. With such high optout costs, the opt-out rate is zero, and 𝑊𝑊 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶.
When 𝑘𝑘 < 𝐶𝐶, informed opt-out is possible. Specifically, an informed individual who learns
that she is type 1 will opt out from High default. If the individual becomes informed, her
48
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expected payoff is: 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ (−𝑘𝑘) − 𝑥𝑥 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥. With High default,
there will be no uninformed opt-out, regardless of k (since 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 > 0). An
individual who remains uninformed will stick with High default and earn a payoff of 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 −
(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶. Therefore, individuals will become informed iff 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥 > 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 −
(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 , or 𝑥𝑥 < (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ (𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘). To summarize, when 𝑘𝑘 < 𝐶𝐶 , a share 𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙
(𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘)� of individuals will become informed and opt out with probability 1 − 𝛼𝛼; and a
share 1 − 𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ (𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘)� will remain uninformed and stick with the High default.
For a given k, the opt-out rate is: (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ (𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘)�. In terms of welfare, for
(1−𝛼𝛼)∙(𝐶𝐶−𝑘𝑘)

any 𝑘𝑘 < 𝐶𝐶 , 𝑊𝑊 = ∫0
𝑘𝑘)))(𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶).

(𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥)𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + (1 − 𝐺𝐺((1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ (𝐶𝐶 −

Special Case: Perfect Information. With perfect information, i.e., with 𝐺𝐺(0) = 1, when
𝑘𝑘 < 𝐶𝐶, the opt-out rate is 1 − 𝛼𝛼, and the welfare level is: 𝑊𝑊 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘. When
𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝐶𝐶, the opt-out rate is zero and welfare equals 𝑊𝑊 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶.

These results are summarized in the following lemma.

Lemma 2 (High Default):
(a) For any 𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝐶𝐶: The opt-out rate is zero and welfare is 𝑊𝑊 = 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶, with
both perfect and imperfect information.
(b) For any 𝑘𝑘 < 𝐶𝐶: With perfect information, the opt-out rate is 1 − 𝛼𝛼 and welfare is
𝑊𝑊 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘; with imperfect information the opt-out rate is (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙
𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ (𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘)� and welfare is
𝑊𝑊 =

(1−𝛼𝛼)∙(𝐶𝐶−𝑘𝑘)

�
0

(𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥)𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

+ (1 − 𝐺𝐺((1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ (𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘)))(𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶)

The role of information costs. With High default, there is no possibility of uninformed
opt-out; only informed opt-out is possible. Therefore, we obtain the standard result that
lower information costs reduce stickiness and increase welfare.
D. Comparison: Low Default v. High Default
We can now compare the two defaults. We focus on the low opt-out costs scenario, to allow
for both informed and uninformed opt-out. Specifically, we assume that 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 −
(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐶). First, consider incentives for information acquisition. With Low default,
information will be acquired when 𝑥𝑥 < (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘). With High default, information
will be acquired when 𝑥𝑥 < (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ (𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘). We can state the following result.
Lemma 3 (Low Default v. High Default: Information Acquisition): Low default induces
more information acquisition.
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We note, however, that when information is costly to acquire, more information is not
necessarily better.
We next compare the stickiness of the two defaults. With Low default, the opt-out rate is:
1 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)� . With High default, the opt-out rate is: (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙
𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ (𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘)�. We see that either rule can be stickier. But more can be said. Let
Δ(𝑘𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)�𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)� + 𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ (𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘)�� denote the difference
between the two opt-out rates. When information costs are lower, 𝛥𝛥(𝑘𝑘) is lower. When
information costs are very low, i.e., when 𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)� + 𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ (𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘)� =
1
2, the opt-out rate is higher with Low default if α > 2; and higher with High default if α <
1

. When information costs are very high, i.e., when 𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)� + 𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙
(𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘)� = 0, the opt our rate is higher with Low default. These and other results are
summarized in the following lemma.

2

Lemma 4 (Low Default v. High Default: Opt-out Rates):
(a) When information costs are lower, 𝛥𝛥(𝑘𝑘) is lower. When information costs are high,
the opt-out rate is higher with Low default. When information costs are low, the
1
opt-out rate is higher with Low default if α > 2, and higher with High default if
1

α < 2.
(b) When the share of type 1 individuals is higher, i.e., when 1 − 𝛼𝛼 is larger, 𝛥𝛥(𝑘𝑘) is
lower. When 1 − 𝛼𝛼 is small, the opt-out rate is higher with Low default. When 1 −
𝛼𝛼 is large, the opt-out rate is higher with Low default if information costs are high,
and higher with High default if information costs are low.
(c) When the cost that High imposes on type 1 individuals, C, is larger, 𝛥𝛥(𝑘𝑘) is lower.

Finally, we turn to welfare levels. With Low default, welfare is:

𝑊𝑊 =

(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶+𝑘𝑘)

(𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) − 𝑥𝑥)𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

�
0

+ �1 − 𝐺𝐺�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)�� (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘)

With High default, welfare is:

𝑊𝑊 =

(1−𝛼𝛼)∙(𝐶𝐶−𝑘𝑘)

�
0

(𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥)𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

+ (1 − 𝐺𝐺((1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ (𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘)))(𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶)
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When information costs are high (i.e., above (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)), the welfare comparison is
determined by the difference: [𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘] − [𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶] = −𝑘𝑘. Namely,
welfare is higher with High default. When information costs are high, individuals do not
acquire information. With High default, the uninformed individuals stick with the default
(since 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 > 0). With Low default, the uninformed individuals engage in
costly (uninformed opt-out). Therefore, High default is more efficient. Stickiness – which,
here, correlates with less need for costly uninformed opt-out – goes hand-in-hand with
welfare outcomes. High default is both sticky and efficient.
When information costs are low (i.e., below (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘), the welfare comparison is
determined by the difference: [𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) − 𝑥𝑥] − [𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥] = (1 − 2𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘.
1
Therefore, welfare is higher with Low default when 𝛼𝛼 < 2, and welfare is higher with High
1

default when 𝛼𝛼 > 2. When information costs are sufficiently low to ensure informed optout, the majoritarian principle determines the optimal default. The default that requires the
least opt-out is more efficient. For this reason, stickiness – which, here, correlates with less
1
need for costly informed opt-out – goes hand in hand with welfare outcomes: When 𝛼𝛼 < 2,
1

Low default is stickier and generates more welfare; and when α > 2, High default is stickier
and generates more welfare.
When information costs are intermediate, such that information is acquired with Low
default, but not with High default (𝑥𝑥 ∈ �(1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ (𝐶𝐶 − 𝑘𝑘), (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ (𝐶𝐶 + 𝑘𝑘)�, the welfare
comparison is determined by the difference: [𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) − 𝑥𝑥] − [𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶] =
(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − 𝑥𝑥. Therefore, when 𝑥𝑥 < (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼, Low default is more efficient;
and when 𝑥𝑥 > (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼, High default is more efficient. At the lower end of the
intermediate information cost range, the benefit from information acquisition (and
informed opt-out) exceeds its cost and Low default is better. At the high end of the range,
the cost of information outweighs its benefit and High default is better. Here, the opt-out
rate with Low default is 𝛼𝛼, and with High default it is zero. The stickier default is more
efficient, when information costs are higher; and the less sticky default is more efficient
when information costs are lower.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Low Default v. High Default: Welfare Levels):
(a) With high information costs, High default is more efficient, and stickier.
𝟏𝟏
(b) With low information costs, when 𝜶𝜶 < 𝟐𝟐 , Low default is more efficient, and
𝟏𝟏

stickier; and when 𝜶𝜶 > 𝟐𝟐, High default is more efficient, and stickier.
(c) With intermediate information costs, at the low end of this range Low default
is more efficient, and less sticky; at the high end of this range High default is
more efficient, and stickier.

The results in parts (a) and (b) of Proposition 2 are not surprising. Part (a) states that, when
parties remain uninformed, policymakers should prefer the default rule that maximizes
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expected value and thus tracks the preferences of the uninformed majority – to avoid costly
uninformed opt-out. And Part (b) instructs the policymaker to follow the preferences of the
informed majority and thus avoid costly informed opt-out, when parties are informed. In
both Parts (a) and (b), stickiness goes hand-in-hand with efficiency, since stickiness implies
fewer costly opt-outs – informed or uninformed. Part (c) focuses on the differences in the
incentives to acquire information under the two default rules. When information
acquisition is costly (at the high end of the intermediate information costs range), High
default, which keeps individuals uninformed and avoids (uninformed) opt-out, is more
efficient, and stickier. The link between stickiness and efficiency is maintained. But when
information is less costly (at the low end of the intermediate information costs range), Low
default is the better rule – by inducing information acquisition, and informed opt-out, Low
default generates better matching between individuals and outcomes. Here, the slippery
rule is more efficient.
E. Inaccurate Beliefs
The preceding analysis assumed that individuals, while (possibly) uninformed about their
type, accurately assess the relative expected payoffs of the two outcomes, Low and High.
Specifically, since the Low payoff was normalized to zero, the assumption was that the
parties know the expected value of High: 𝜋𝜋 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶. We now introduce the
possibility of inaccurate beliefs and allow parties to hold beliefs 𝜋𝜋� ≠ 𝜋𝜋 about the expected
value of High. And since 𝜋𝜋 > 0 (High is better on average), we will focus on inaccurate
beliefs – about 𝛼𝛼, B or C – that result in 𝜋𝜋� < 0 (Low is perceived to be better on average).
As we will see, the object of the inaccurate beliefs – 𝛼𝛼, B or C – affects the analysis, so we
need to separately denote the perceived values of the three parameters: 𝛼𝛼� , 𝐵𝐵� and 𝐶𝐶̂ .
(Inaccurate beliefs about k and x are also possible.)

We focus on the low opt-out costs scenario (𝑘𝑘 < |𝜋𝜋�|), where the mechanical opt-out costs
are low enough to permit both informed and uninformed opt-out. For informed parties, the
analysis does not change. An informed individual who learns that she is type 2 will opt out
from Low default and stick with High default. The inaccurate beliefs affect the decisions
and behavior of uninformed parties. These parties who opted out of Low default and stuck
with High default in the accurate beliefs analysis, now stick with Low default and opt out
of High default.

Low default. An informed individual who learns that she is type 2 will opt out from Low
default. The expected payoff of an individual who becomes informed is: 𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) − 𝑥𝑥,
and the perceived payoff is: 𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� − 𝑘𝑘� − 𝑥𝑥. An uninformed individual sticks with Low and
earns a payoff of zero. Therefore, individuals will become informed iff 𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� − 𝑘𝑘� − 𝑥𝑥 > 0,
or 𝑥𝑥 < 𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� − 𝑘𝑘� . A share 𝐺𝐺 �𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� − 𝑘𝑘�� will become informed and opt out with
probability 𝛼𝛼; and a share 1 − 𝐺𝐺 �𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� − 𝑘𝑘�� will remain uninformed and stick with the
Low default (opt-out rate of zero). These results are summarized in the following lemma.
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Lemma 1a (Low Default; Low Opt-out Costs; Inaccurate Beliefs): When 𝜋𝜋� < 0, for any
𝑘𝑘 ≤ |𝜋𝜋�|: With perfect information, the opt-out rate is 𝛼𝛼 and welfare is 𝑊𝑊 = 𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘);
with imperfect information the opt-out rate is 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 �𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� − 𝑘𝑘�� and welfare is
�(𝐵𝐵�−𝑘𝑘)
𝛼𝛼

𝑊𝑊 = �
0

(𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) − 𝑥𝑥)𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

Importantly, and counterintuitively, with inaccurate beliefs a policy aimed at reducing
information costs might reduce efficiency. Specifically, when information costs are
reduced from 𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� − 𝑘𝑘� + 𝜀𝜀 to 𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� − 𝑘𝑘� − 𝜀𝜀, welfare changes from zero to 𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) −
𝑥𝑥. When 𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘) < 𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� − 𝑘𝑘� and 𝑥𝑥 ∈ �𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 − 𝑘𝑘), 𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� − 𝑘𝑘��, the lower information

costs reduce welfare. (The identified, perverse effect of lowering information costs requires
𝛼𝛼� > 𝛼𝛼 or 𝐵𝐵� > 𝐵𝐵 . Our analysis focuses on inaccurate beliefs that imply 𝜋𝜋� = 𝛼𝛼�𝐵𝐵� −
(1 − 𝛼𝛼�)𝐶𝐶̂ < 0, instead of the accurate 𝜋𝜋 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 > 0. Within this constraint, it
is still possible to get the perverse effect, if 𝐶𝐶̂ > 𝐶𝐶 .) We summarize this result in the
following corollary.
Corollary 1: With inaccurate beliefs, lower information costs might decrease welfare.

High default. An informed individual who learns that she is type 1 will opt out from High
default. The expected payoff of an individual who becomes informed is: 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙
𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥, and the perceived payoff is: 𝛼𝛼�𝐵𝐵� − (1 − 𝛼𝛼�) ∙ 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥. An individual who remains
uninformed will opt out to Low and earn a payoff of −𝑘𝑘. Therefore, individuals will
become informed iff 𝛼𝛼�𝐵𝐵� − (1 − 𝛼𝛼�) ∙ 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥 > −𝑘𝑘, or 𝑥𝑥 < 𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� + 𝑘𝑘�. A share 𝐺𝐺 �𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� +
𝑘𝑘�� of individuals will become informed and opt out with probability 1 − 𝛼𝛼; and a share
1 − 𝐺𝐺 �𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� + 𝑘𝑘�� will remain uninformed and opt out with probability 100%. These
results are summarized in the following lemma.

Lemma 2a (High Default; Low Opt-out Costs; Inaccurate Beliefs): When 𝜋𝜋� < 0, for any
𝑘𝑘 ≤ |𝜋𝜋�|: With perfect information, the opt-out rate is 1 − 𝛼𝛼 and welfare is 𝑊𝑊 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 −
(1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘; with imperfect information the opt-out rate is (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝐺𝐺 �𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� + 𝑘𝑘�� + 1 −
𝐺𝐺 �𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� + 𝑘𝑘�� = 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 �𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� + 𝑘𝑘�� and welfare is
�(𝐵𝐵�+𝑘𝑘)
𝛼𝛼

𝑊𝑊 = �
0

(𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥)𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 − �1 − 𝐺𝐺 �𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� + 𝑘𝑘��� ∙ 𝑘𝑘

As with Low default, here too lower information costs might reduce efficiency.
Specifically, when information costs are reduced from 𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� + 𝑘𝑘� + 𝜀𝜀 to 𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� + 𝑘𝑘� − 𝜀𝜀,

53
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3582129

welfare changes from −𝑘𝑘 to 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥. When 𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 + 𝑘𝑘) < 𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� + 𝑘𝑘� and 𝑥𝑥 ∈
�𝛼𝛼(𝐵𝐵 + 𝑘𝑘), 𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� + 𝑘𝑘��, the lower information costs reduce welfare.
Comparison. Inaccurate beliefs alter the comparison between the two defaults. When
information costs are high, welfare is greater with Low default, since it is Low default that
now avoids the cost of uninformed opt-out (albeit inefficient uninformed opt-out). When
information costs are low, information is acquired and thus beliefs, accurate or inaccurate,
about average payoffs do not matter. (The assumption is that when an individual invests in
information acquisition, she learns her type and obtains accurate information about all
relevant parameters.)
When information costs are intermediate (𝑥𝑥 ∈ �𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� − 𝑘𝑘�, 𝛼𝛼��𝐵𝐵� + 𝑘𝑘��), we find that now
High default generates stronger incentives to acquire information. The welfare comparison
is determined by the difference: [0] − [𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥] = −𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘 + 𝑥𝑥.
Therefore, when 𝑥𝑥 < 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘 , High default is more efficient; and when 𝑥𝑥 >
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑘, Low default is more efficient. At the lower end of the intermediate
information cost range, the benefit from information acquisition (and informed opt-out)
exceeds its cost and High default is better. At the high end of the range, the cost of
information outweighs its benefit and Low default is better. Here, the opt-out rate with
High default is 1 − 𝛼𝛼, and with Low default it is zero. The stickier default is more efficient,
when information costs are higher; and the less sticky default is more efficient when
information costs are lower.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Low Default v. High Default: Welfare Levels; Inaccurate Beliefs):
(a) With high information costs, Low default is more efficient, and stickier.
𝟏𝟏
(b) With low information costs, when 𝜶𝜶 < 𝟐𝟐 , Low default is more efficient, and
𝟏𝟏

stickier; and when 𝜶𝜶 > 𝟐𝟐, High default is more efficient, and stickier.
(c) With intermediate information costs, at the low end of this range High default
is more efficient, and less sticky; at the high end of this range Low default is
more efficient, and stickier.

When information costs are high, inaccurate beliefs flip the policy prescription – from High
default to Low default. The driving force is, again, the uninformed opt-out. Uninformed
parties will inevitably end up with the inefficient outcome, Low. The best that the
policymaker can do is avoid the cost of inefficient, uninformed opt-outs. Inaccurate beliefs
also flip the ordering of incentives to acquire information, such that, when information
costs are intermediate, High default induces more information acquisition. The
policymaker should thus prefer High default when information costs are at the low end of
this range, and Low default when information costs are higher.
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